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Abstract:  
The thesis covers an in-depth analysis of the internal operations of the Egyptian military 
and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp. In light of recent rebellions in Egypt and Iran, 
the paper will examine how the security, economic, and political role of these two 
institutions has led to Egypt’s betrayal of President Mubarak, and the IRGC’s loyalty to 
the Iranian leadership. The role of these two institutions will be investigated using Steven 
Johnson’s Emergence Theory. In using Johnson’s theory, this thesis will aim to uncover 
the function, performance, and system of two institutions that have become autonomous 
within their respective state.    
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Egypt and Iran have relied on elaborate security organizations for regime stability. 
The mission of these organizations ranges from subduing an array of external threats, 
internal threats, and in some cases, foreign espionage. However, the institutions within 
these two nations are not strictly limited to the purposes of national security and defense. 
Although both these nations have experienced major changes in their government within 
the previous century, the role of these coercive forces has continued to have a profound 
effect. Their power has expanded into various areas of society including affairs of the 
state and the economy, resulting into a dominant and influential force within their 
respective country.    
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Egyptian Military spark the fear 
of torture and death for many Iranian and Egyptian citizens, who are well aware that 
these security organizations are present in almost every facet of society. However, in the 
summer of 2009 following the disputed presidential elections, Iranian citizens challenged 
the capabilities of paramilitary forces including the IRGC and the Basij (basij means 
mobilization).  The IRGC and the Basij obeyed their orders and put down the rebellion, 
and the regime held. Soon after, in the fall of 2010, the Arab revolts began. Tunisia was 
first, and then Egypt experienced a great transformation. Unlike the fate of the Iranian 
uprising, the Egyptian revolution illustrated a penetrable component in breaking the 
military’s loyalty to Mubarak.  
Although the shift of the military’s loyalty was not the only variable responsible 
for the success of the revolutionaries, it can be said that the Egyptian military determined 
the major turning point of the rebellion. In cases, the structure and mold necessary to 
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preserve the loyalty of these powerful organizations is essential. Without the support of 
these powerful institutions, whose influence extends within all parts of society, the 
regime stability of Egypt and Iran becomes jeopardized.  
Steven Johnson’s version of the emergence theory will be applied to the 
organizational structure of the IRGC and the Egyptian military. The emergence theory is 
when components interact with one another to self-organize into a complex system. In 
doing so, a better basis for an in-depth analysis of the workings of the IRGC and the 
Egyptian military can be conceived. Furthermore, answer the question as to why the 
IRGC remained loyal to Ayatollah Khomeini’s regime, whereas the Egyptian military 
broke faith and failed to protect President Hosni Mubarak’s rule.  
The reason for comparing the institutions of Iran and Egypt, in part, is due to the 
fact that the uprisings in Egypt and Iran resulted in different outcomes, in which the 
success of the Egyptians must be greatly attributed to the military. The IRGC and the 
Egyptian Army are also similar in the fact that they are major players within their 
respective countries who hold power within many facets of the nation. In a sense, the 
organizations act as their own state within the country.    
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METHODOLOGY 
 
This thesis will analyze the behavior of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps 
and the Egyptian Military as a result of the recent rebellions by answering the following 
questions: 
1. What incentives have encouraged members of the IRGC, as well as the Egyptian 
military to remain loyal to the regime? 
2. What role has the IRGC and the Egyptian military played within various areas of 
society?  
3. How does Steven Johnson’s emergence theory apply to the structural organization of 
the IRGC and the Egyptian military?  
4. What led the Egyptian military to abandon Mubarak?  
5. Under what circumstances could the IRGC follow in the Egyptian military’s footsteps 
and take control over Iran?   
 
The first chapter will be a brief history of the IRGC, beginning from the time it 
was established - following the 1979 Islamic revolution - through the presidency of 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. A brief history of the Egyptian military will also be presented, 
beginning from Nasser’s regime in 1952.  The role of these institutions will be discussed 
before and during the uprising in Iran and the revolution in Egypt. Their popularity, or 
lack of it, will also be analyzed in order to better examine their position within their 
respective country.  Also, this chapter will begin to discuss the organization of the IRGC 
and the Egyptian military relative to Steven Johnson’s view of the emergence theory, in 
which later chapters will evaluate the structure and workings of these organizations in 
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order to reach a conclusion regarding the applicability and importance of implementing 
emergence theory. 
The second chapter will focus on the military and security role of these 
institutions, discussing the original purpose for the creation of the IRGC, and how the 
Iran-Iraq war enhanced the position of Khomeini and the IRGC. This will be followed by 
an examination of the current role of the IRGC and the military, including other armed 
forces that participated in the rebellions, such as the Basij. The tension between the 
Artesh (Iranian professional military) and the IRGC will also be examined in order to 
define the two different roles that these Iranian armed forces play. Lastly, within this 
second chapter, the suppression of the green movement in Iran and the success of the 
Egyptian revolution will be discussed regarding the efforts made by the two armed forces 
to quash civil unrest.  
Chapter three will examine the economic involvement of the IRGC and the 
Egyptian military, in which they have become a dominant force in most sectors of the 
economy. The network of current and former members of both the IRGC and the 
Egyptian military within the economic sector will be examined. This will include where 
these institutions receive funds, as well as where they have the ability to tap into other 
funds. The effects of the international sanctions on Iran will also highlight the economic 
benefits that the IRGC is reaping.  This chapter will then analyze how economic 
influence of the IRGC and the Egyptian military impacted the outcome of the rebellions 
in Iran and Egypt. Lastly, the economic incentives given to these organizations will be 
applied to Johnson’s model of the emergence theory.  
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The fourth chapter will concentrate on the political influence of these institutions. 
It will discuss the contention between Reformists and Conservatives, and how it impacts 
the operation of the IRGC. In Egypt, the 1952 overthrow of the Egyptian monarchy led to 
senior military officers serving as the Egyptian President, Prime Minister, and in cabinet 
and senior government positions.  The origin of the political role of both these institutions 
will be examined in relation to other political leaders. The evolution of their current 
ideology will be examined, and applied to the rebellions in both countries, as well as 
Johnson’s emergence theory.  
In the conclusion and final chapter, the future of the IRGC and Egyptian military 
will be discussed in respect to Steven Johnson’s emergence theory. It will also analyze 
the circumstances that could push the IRGC to turn away from the Iranian leadership, and 
the circumstances that could unite the Egyptian military with the future leader of Egypt.   
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CHAPTER ONE: 
The history, the uprising, the revolution, and the emergence theory 
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HISTORY OF THE IRANIAN REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS 
 
Iran-Iraq War 
 The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, or Pasdaran (Guardians), is a branch of 
the military that formed following the 1979 Islamic Revolution when Ayatollah 
Khomeini issued a decree on May 5
th
 of that same year for its conception (Moin, 2003). It 
is currently Iran’s most powerful security organization, and was created to protect and 
preserve the goal of the revolution. Shah Muhammad Reza Pahlavi solely relied on the 
imperial army to protect his regime, so when Khomeini took power, the Supreme Leader 
needed to be able to rely on his own coercive force. The military was looked upon with 
suspicion and distrust which led the religious leader to create a security organization, in 
which its purpose would be to safeguard the ideology of the new regime. Rather than 
using potentially tainted units, the IRGC was formed to counter loyalists in the military 
that may have still existed, and to establish legitimacy for the new found country.  The 
IRGC symbolized a quickly developed new order that would eventually dominate the 
republic.  
Under the Constitution of Iran, the IRGC is said to be responsible for guarding the 
independence and territorial integrity of the country, as well as the internal stability of the 
Islamic Republic.  The Constitution also states that the IRGC must be an Islamic Army, 
committed to Islamic ideology and the people. 
1
 However, under Ayatollah Ali 
Khameini, the position of the IRGC began to evolve into a force that would surpass its 
constitutional powers and ideological purpose.  
 
                                               
1 See Article 150 of the Constitution of The Islamic Republic of Iran.  
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Post Iran-Iraq War 
The result of the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war paved the way for the ascendency of 
the IRGC. The war boosted the morale and confidence in the new regime. This united the 
people of Iran to support the IRGC for its successful efforts, and as a result, established 
the organization as the primary coercive force for internal and external ventures.  
The “sacred defense” against Iraq necessitated the Iranian government to mold the 
IRGC into a conventional armed force (Wehrey, et al., 2009).  However, this action may 
not have only been accomplished for the purpose of winning a war. Many IRGC 
commanders, as well as revolutionary leaders, like Khomeini, hoped to use the war not 
only to assert their territorial integrity, but as an opportunity to further establish the goals 
of the revolution. It is argued that the IRGC intentionally prolonged the war in order to 
marginalize the efforts of the Artesh, or Iranian Army (Abrahamian, 1992). Another 
reason for the argument of the drawn out war is that extra time could be given to the 
IRGC to remove any potential opponents of the revolution that may have still been 
present within the Artesh.  
The concern of the IRGC and the Islamic Republic Party (IRP) was not just 
paranoia, for in the summer of 1980 before the Iraqi invasion, the army had attempted 
organize several coup schemes. The IRGC and IRP made sure to spread the army thin 
throughout the western border of Iran in order to prevent a repeat of such an undertaking 
(Wehrey, et al., 2009).  As long as the Artesh had minimal contact with other affiliates, 
Khomeini and his associates could reduce the threat of another potential uprising.   
Today, the IRGC uses the success of the Iran-Iraq war to bolster its legitimacy. 
This theme becomes apparent in the economic and political arena that the organization 
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dominates. For instance, a reenactment or symbol representing the aftermath of the war is 
often depicted within construction and public works (Wehrey, et al., 2009). As an 
Iranian-born scholar and frequent visitor to the country, a man who chose to remain 
anonymous, stated regarding the IRGC’s role in the war:  
             The bravery of the IRGC (during the Iran-Iraq War) is mostly an idea  
             propagated by the government with no particular appeal or currency within  
Iran itself. In fact, many Iranians blame the IRGC for an excessively long  
and futile eight-year war against Iraq. Many believe that Iran, with a  
population two times larger than that of Iraq, could not defeat its forces  
because of the Guards’ nadanam kari (inexperience), emotionally, and ideological 
zealotry. 
2
   
 
Nonetheless, the statement above may very well not match the attitude of the 
majority of Iranians. For many Iranians, the husbands, fathers, sons, and brothers died in 
the war, and became shahids (martyrs). Families of these men support the IRGC’s 
endeavors, because the IRGC became victorious in a war in which their friends and 
family sacrificed their lives. For many Iranians, to support the IRGC, means to support 
the revolution’s goals that loved ones fought to protect.  
The importance of the Iran-Iraq war is crucial to the evolution of the IRGC, for it 
is the event that catapulted their popularity and established their place in society. The 
Iran-Iraq war expanded the organization of the Basij-e Mostaz'afin (Mobilization of the 
Oppressed), a paramilitary volunteer militia that was formed in November 1979. The 
Basij was used to conduct massive raids on Iraqi forces. The credited victory of the IRGC 
persuaded the IRP to provide more military equipment, and most of all, a permanent edge 
over the regular military.   
                                               
2 Interview with an Iranian-born scholar conducted by Frederic Wehrey on  October 24th, 2007.   
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The end of the war also opened the door to a new regime. Following Khomeini’s 
death in 1989, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei became the new Supreme Leader, while Akhbar 
Rafsanjani began his presidency in August of that same year. Rafsanjani’s role as 
president was to centralize more power in the presidency. He also sought to pursue a free 
market economy, contradicting the preference of hardliners. Rafsanjani was popular with 
the upper and middle classes because of his economic reforms and support for human 
rights. Although he may have left a positive mark for the middle and upper class Iranians, 
he failed to gain popularity with the working class, the elderly, and the rural population 
where support was needed most. (Chua-Eoan, 2009) This was because his economic 
reforms failed to reach the groups that were the most deprived of financial means. The 
major disapproval from hardliners would lead to the increasing power of the IRGC 
during Khamenei’s tenure as Supreme Leader. 
When Khamenei assumed the role of Supreme Leader in 1989, he lacked much 
popularity, and looked to the IRGC to maintain his position as the Grand Ayatollah. He 
needed to not only protect his post, but the regime as well. As a result, Khamenei rejected 
the idea of merging the military and the IRGC, as Rafsanjani was hoping to accomplish. 
In an interview with the Fars news agency, former Commander-in-Chief of the 
Revolutionary Guard Rahim Safavi stated:  
 
…the Supreme Leader from the early days of his leadership raised opposition  
to the plan, and the plan ceased to be implemented. The Supreme Leader believed that the 
Revolutionary Guard and the regular army have to remain  
two separate institutions with different duties (Fars News Agency, Iran Briefing – Human 
Rights Violation by Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, 2012).  
 
 IRGC commanders believed Rafsanjani’s reforms threatened the values of the 
revolution (Global Security, 2011). These same sentiments were exhibited by the IRGC 
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during Mohammad Khatami's presidency when the reform movement took off. The 1999 
student protests prompted the IRGC to warn Khatami of the necessary actions they would 
take if the president were to endanger the pillars of the revolution (Global Security, 
2011).  In a 2003 letter written to the Majlis speaker by former IRGC Chief Commander 
Yahya Rahim Safavi: 
 
The IRGC considers itself responsible for the defense of the Islamic  
Revolution, its achievements, and the ideology and values of Imam  
Khomeini. We insist upon avoiding political games and infighting among different 
parties and groups. [Parliamentarians] should also refrain from extremist actions and 
respect the dignity of the Majlis. Our main mission is to stop those who wish to destroy 
and overthrow the Islamic Revolution (Global Security, 2011). 
 
 
In September of 2007, Ayatollah Khamenei appointed Mohammed Ali Jafari as 
the new IRGC commander. Jafari’s experience had proven him to be a committed and 
loyal leader of the IRGC. He has commanded the IRGC land forces for 15 years, fought 
in the Iran-Iraq war as a Basij volunteer, and was supposedly one of the students who 
held 52 Americans hostage for over a year in Tehran from 1979 to 1981(Iran Briefing – 
Human Rights Violation by Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, 2012).  
The extended power of the IRGC civilian society and politics required the 
executive, judicial, and legislative branch of the Islamic Republic to be subservient to the 
interests and demands of the IRGC. Disobeying the IRGC or the Supreme Leader would 
lead to severe punishment. When Ahmadinejad refused to reinstate intelligence minister 
Heyder Moslehi in 2011, as ordered by Khamenei, Ahmadinejad was punished by having 
the Oil Ministry fall under the control of the IRGC (Iran Briefing – Human Rights 
Violation by Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, 2012).  
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Although the IRGC and Ahmadinejad have usually had a close relationship, this 
event caused a major rift. In a July 2011 interview, Jafari described Ahmadinejad as 
“deviant current” that needed to be tamed (Nader, 2011). Jafari also hinted at the Guards 
involvement in the conditions for future elections, stating that reformists - Ahmadinejad’s 
political enemies - who had not crossed the regime’s “red lines”, would be allowed to 
participate (Nader, 2011).   
Jafari’s statements clearly displayed the political power of the IRGC. Since 
Khamenei has assigned IRGC members to key positions within the government, 
parliament, and judiciary, he is able to maintain stability within the regime. If members 
of the IRGC in senior positions oppose his actions or fail to meet Khamenei’s standards, 
he would easily be able to replace them with eager IRGC affiliates.   
However, that is not to say that Khamenei has all the power in the relationship 
between him and the IRGC. In fact, it is reciprocal. Originally, many Iranians opposed 
Khamenei’s appointment as Supreme Leader. Khamenei’s position as Supreme Leader 
became respected when the IRGC stood behind the legitimacy of his appointment.  The 
IRGC could just as quickly remove their support for the Supreme Leader, if conflict 
between the two were to arise.  
 
THE GREEN MOVEMENT 
 
Following the disputed elections in June of 2009, a series of protests occurred 
embodying a number of different interests. Within the green movement, a number of 
different groups created their own faction that incorporated the broad goals of the 
movement, which included a women’s movement and youth movement. The color green 
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was originally used as the symbol for presidential candidate Mir Hossein Mousavi's 
campaign, but after the fraudulent election, the color transformed into the symbol of hope 
and unity for those seeking the annulment of the election (NowPublic, 2009). Throughout 
the summer and fall of 2009, the opposition would organize mass demonstrations. The 
participants mostly consisted of upper class and educated Iranians.  Nonetheless, by the 
beginning of 2010, the IRGC had successfully quashed public displays of the protests.  
As with any revolution or uprising, the green movement encompassed different 
types of ambitions from various factions. However, the one common goal of these groups 
was to remodel a despotic and dictatorial government, yet avoid a revolution leading that 
could lead to the overthrow of the Islamic Republic. The green movement cannot be 
easily defined. Various political analysts and scholars find it difficult to interpret an 
uprising that has made contradictory remarks regarding the nature of its purpose. The 
message of the green movement is unclear in relation to its main argument and 
democratic assertions (The Gulf Research Unit’s Blog, 2010).   
Dr. Yadullah Shahibzadeh, from the University of Oslo, bases the green 
movement’s democratic argument on two presumptions; “first there was a popular 
revolution that produced a constitution which declares that all Iranian citizens have equal 
political rights, secondly, there are Iranian citizens who now demand these political 
rights” (The Gulf Research Unit’s Blog, 2010).  He claims that in order to fully grasp the 
meaning behind the movement, the time period from the 1979 Iranian Revolution up until 
the green movement must be greatly taken into account. He states that without this 
knowledge, the movement cannot be understood. The movement, according to 
Shahibzadeh, is a continuation of the mass demonstrations that occurred in 1979. The 
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promise of a democratic government affirming the basic principle for every citizen to 
have the right to govern or speak out against political or ideological content was, without 
a doubt, never achieved. This policy was justified up until the late 1980’s, in order to 
prevent oppositional forces from jeopardizing the newfound Islamic Republic (The Gulf 
Research Unit’s Blog, 2010).    
Then, there is dissident cleric Mohsen Kadivar who explains the main features of 
the green movement in vague and broad terms. He identifies seven aspects of the 
movement, and states that the overall purpose of the Iranian protestors is to “peacefully 
remove a usurper president and replace him [President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad] with 
their own choice” (Rooz Online, 2009).  He describes the green movement as a peaceful 
protest that is against violence and advocates the strengthening of democracy and human 
rights. He also explicitly states that the movement is independent from foreign influence, 
and is the result of humiliated Iranians whose votes were discounted. Overall, he 
describes the green movement as an ethical movement, in which the Iranian people are 
fighting against “lies, cheating, and treason” within the government.  
However, the three other aspects of the green movement Kadivar mentions within 
his interview directly display the mixed messages of the uprising. Although the IRGC 
dominates almost all sectors of society, and is powerful enough to quell a protest, the 
blurred and sometimes contradictory statements made the movement easier for the IRGC 
to squash. The expression of the green movement coincided with the same rhetoric as that 
of the 1979 revolution. This has made it especially difficult for the leaders of the uprising 
to definitively differentiate their position from the demands of the Iranian revolution.  
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Kadivar summarizes Mousavi’s words in saying “that the nature of this movement 
is Islamic and has asked that all slogans begin with ‘Allah-u-akbar’ and that Islamic 
institutions should be used as much as possible” (Rooz Online, 2009).  And yet, 
immediately after this is mentioned, Kadivar states that the movement absolutely against 
using religion as a tool. Even within an interview from one man, the message of the green 
movement becomes abstract in its contradictory features.  
Lastly, Kadivar states that the movement is not aiming to begin a revolution, for 
“it wants to attain its goals legally through the use of the existing constitution”. However, 
clauses in the constitution regarding human rights– freedom of belief, freedom of protest, 
protection of torture – become irrelevant when the Valiyat-e faqih is applied. The term 
literally means the guardianship of the religious jurist. The theory was developed by 
Khomeini and applied to the newly constructed constitution following the overthrow of 
the shah. This clause bestows ultimate power to the one man, known as the vali-e-faqih, 
who has a thorough knowledge of Islamic law, is an Imam, and considered an heir to the 
Prophet Muhammad. No Muslim living in the jurisdiction of the vali-e-faqih can overrule 
the absolute authority of the leader (Mohaddessin, 1993).  
Thus, for Kadivar to state that the green movement is choosing to attain its goals 
through the legality of the constitution means that the protestors must also recognize the 
Valiyat-e faqih. The IRGC may be a powerful and influential institution within Iran, but 
the contradictory messages and unrealistic approaches to attain their human rights may 
have very well contributed to the dominance that the IRGC had over the situation.   
Nonetheless, the role of the IRGC in the 2009 presidential election cannot be 
ignored. Senior Guards officials did not want to risk their strong hold over the regime 
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with a reformist, such as former Prime Minister Mir Hossein Mousavi. Former Guard 
officer turned businessman, Interior Minister Sadegh Mahsouli, was in charge of 
supervising the election. He played a critical role in Ahmadinejad’s re-election, resulting 
in mass protest for about six months that the Guards were responsible for suppressing 
(Wright, 2011). Later chapters will discuss the political role of the IRGC in regards to the 
green movement in more depth.  
            However, there are some ideological differences within the IRGC. Many respect 
Mousavi, who committed himself to the revolution and the Iran-Iraq War during his time 
as prime minister in the 1980s. Some Guards have also expressed disappointment with 
Ahmadinejad and Khamenei as a result of the conduct in quelling the demonstrations 
(Wright, 2011). Despite personal differences regarding the post-election protests, the 
beneficial relationship between Khamenei and top Guard officials will most likely 
guarantee the IRGC’s role as protector of the principles of the revolution (Wright, 2011).  
 
 
HISTORY OF EGYPTIAN MILITARY 
NASSER 
Similarly to the IRGC, the Egyptian military began to acquire considerable power 
within the country following the 1952 overthrow of the monarchy for the pursuit of Arab 
socialism. The overthrow of King Farouk on July 17
th
 of 1952 opened the door for Gamal 
Abdel Nasser Hussein to further integrate the military into civilian positions of society 
(Middle East Policy Council, 2012). However; this of course did not take place until the 
Free Officers disposed of top ranking military officers within King Farouk’s regime. The 
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Free Officers were an organization composed of junior and middle ranking military 
officers following the Egyptian defeat in the 1948 Israeli-Arab War. The organization 
was founded by Nasser, whose experience in the Israeli-Arab war molded his 
dissatisfaction for top military ranking officers and the monarchy (Nasser, 1973).  As an 
officer, Nasser described his superiors with disgust stating: 
They were overfed, lazy and selfish, and they spent their time eating,  
drinking, carousing, smoking hashish and engaging in many different  
forms of tyranny and corruption. They were fawning and subservient to  
the British Military Mission and a disgrace to the uniform they wore.  
They spent money that belonged to the Egyptian army on food and drink  
for themselves (Baker, 1978). 
 
The Free Officers’ motivation for revolution did not stem entirely from their 
defeat in war, or their repulsion against high ranking officers. The people within the 
group came from many different ideological backgrounds, who all desired to remove the 
monarchy. Some had more liberal views while others belonged to either fascist groups or 
Islamic groups, including the Muslim Brotherhood. Nonetheless, all members of the Free 
Officers were “nationalistic in orientation” and loathed the Egyptian monarchy as well as 
its British masters (Middle East Policy Council, 2012).  
By 1955, Nasser and the Free Officers had defeated their political opponents and 
were able to create a renewed Egypt built on unquestioned military power (Middle East 
Policy Council, 2012). The Egyptian military began to take over business and 
commercial sectors within Egypt, in which some divisions of the Free Officers were 
highly opposed. “The coup plotters were not modernizers and developers” of any sort, for 
when they seized power, the necessity for social transformation in creating a progressive 
state was hindered by military rule (Middle East Policy Council, 2012). According to 
Ahmed S. Hashim of the United States Naval War College, “the Egyptian officers who 
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seized power in 1952 may have had ‘progressive’ ideas, but the institution they emerged 
from was certainly not a modern or advanced institution” (Middle East Policy Council, 
2012).  
Nasser’s charisma and nationalist goals may have contributed to the overlooked 
military run society. During his presidency the percentage of officers in cabinet positions 
ranged from 32 percent to 65 percent (Tusa, 1989). Except for one civilian, from 1952 to 
1967, all top positions within the country were held by military members. This would 
include positions in the field of law, medicine, engineering, and politics. Between 1962 
and 1967, 27 out of the 65 men who held the highest political positions were officers 
(Dekmejian, 1994). Placing members of the military within these top positions secured 
the power of the Free Officers within all sectors of society.  However, this is not to say 
that the Egyptian military aligned themselves with one social class. Military men would 
involve themselves in almost every facet of a certain sector within society in order to 
ensure and advance their power.  
Nonetheless, increased power of the military created tension. Nasser’s military 
reign can be best described as the rule of the Free Officers and their military companions, 
so when the military’s involvement in politics grew, Nasser and armed-forces 
commander Abdel Hakim Amer did not see eye to eye (Middle East Policy Council, 
2012). Nonetheless, Nasser chose to keep him in his post. 
Overall, the years between 1955 and 1966 proved to be one of the most brutal 
years for the Egyptian military in terms of effectiveness (Middle East Policy Council, 
2012). This included the Suez War and their involvement in the North Yemen Civil War 
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from 1962 to 1970 (Global Security, 2011).  This prompted Nasser to look to the Soviets 
for the purchase of more advanced equipment and weaponry.  
The Soviet connection was pursued after the humiliation for Nasser and his nation 
at the hands of the Israeli assault in the Gaza Strip. Nasser would establish the 20-year 
arms relationship that would ensue with the Soviets (Middle East Policy Council, 2012). 
However, the influx of the new equipment proved to be of little use with Amer 
overseeing the implementation of the supplies to the armed forces. Amer did not properly 
train the army to use the highly modernized supplies in the most effective way possible. 
The army lacked detailed training with the new equipment they were given, especially 
when the materials were being provided at an excessive pace. Amer’s character stepped 
in the way of his professionalism, for his main focus was the political power and 
advantages that his post could give him. Amer would also integrate his men into the 
political field in order to serve for his benefit. The politicization of his men steered from 
Nasser’s goals of pan-Arabism when future military expeditions would prove to be 
fruitless, and the institution would become a center of competition. 
The Egyptians involvement in the counterinsurgency of the Yemen Civil War cost 
the military a considerable amount in resources, including men and supplies (James, 
2006). The military may have failed in its’ endeavor, but the experience also displayed 
some profound benefits for officers and the enlistment process. According to Hashim:  
 
…the war led to the emergence of a privileged and corrupt category of  
military personnel who enjoyed a doubling of basic pay, the ability to  
import consumer and luxury goods that were scarce in socialist Egypt and  
access to low-interest loans to buy Egyptian-made Nasr cars (Middle East  
Policy Council, 2012). 
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Many of the soldiers insisted on serving in Yemen in order to receive these 
benefits, for their service would provide access to “better medical care and preferential 
treatment for placement in universities” for themselves and their families (Middle East 
Policy Council, 2012). Top officers such as Amer made a fortune from the war.  
The embarrassing loss of the Egyptians to the Israelis in the Six Day War 
reverberated in Moscow. The sales of their weapons and equipment to their Arab allies 
were going to waste. This prompted the Soviets to train the Egyptians, leading to the 
restructuring of the demoralized military. This included the removal of Amer and the 
expansion and extensive training of military ranks. However, this caused tension within 
the military. The officers were not fond of the Soviets, for they felt that the Soviets 
looked upon them with contempt and acted as if they controlled the ranks they were 
training (Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, 1970). Egyptians found it particularly satisfying 
when “Israelis shot down four or five Soviet piloted MiG-21s — part of Egypt's rebuilt 
air defenses — over the Suez in 1971” (Middle East Policy Council, 2012).    
 
 
 
SADAT 
 
 However, just as the Egyptian military began to go through a transformation, 
Nasser died of a heart attack. In 1971, Vice President Anwar El-Sadat became the new 
president of Egypt (Middle East Policy Council, 2012).  His appointment was met with 
much criticism by his peers. He lacked the appeal of Nasser, and many thought that he 
would not last long as president. Sadat faced much opposition, in which he was able to 
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overcome when he gained the support of senior officers. Sadat was able to appeal to their 
sense of loyalty, legitimacy and professionalism (Gawrych, 2000).  
 He restructured the armed forces by demoting and promoting officers to various 
positions in order to guarantee the loyalty of the Egyptian military. Mohamad Ahmad 
Sadik became minister of war after Mohamad Fawzi's demotion for his Nasserist 
inclinations, while Lathi Nasif became commander of the presidential guard (Middle East 
Policy Council, 2012). 
Sadat faced many challenges early in his presidency. Heavy defense spending 
contributed to the sinking economy, while Israel continued to occupy Sinai (Middle East 
Policy Council, 2012). The occupation of Sinai aroused much criticism and doubt in 
Sadat’s ability to expel the Israelis. However, in preparing for the 1973 Yom Kippur 
War, the president focused his abilities on depoliticizing the armed forces rather than 
focusing on the military’s readiness to enter conflict. Sadat reassigned positions fit for 
men who were apolitical. He chose Ahmad Ismail Ali for the position of General, and 
Abd al-Ghani Gamasy as Chief of Staff (Middle East Policy Council, 2012). Dr. 
Raymond Hinnebusch, professor of International Relations and Middle East Studies at 
the University of St. Andrews states, “Gamasi, the very model of the respected non-
political professional prepared to defer to the authority of the president, became the key 
figure in further consolidating the principle of military non-intervention in political 
matters” (Middle East Policy Council, 2012).  Sadat had also reduced the representation 
of military officers in ministries to 20 percent, changing the armed forces into an 
autonomous organization (Middle East Policy Council, 2012).  
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The military continued to loyally serve Sadat following the angry outburst of the 
infitah (opening) policy (Middle East Policy Council, 2012). After the 1973 war, the 
economy began to take a turn for the worse. This required Sadat to “promote reform and 
modernization”, in which the Egyptian people were faced with the reduction of basic 
commodities such as rice and cooking gas (Middle East Policy Council, 2012). In all 
major cities angry protestors littered the streets, including workers, the poor, and 
students. When the police and security forces could not quash the riots, Sadat was forced 
to turn to the military (Baker, 1990).  
 Newly promoted Minister of Defense Gamasy was reluctant to have the army 
intervene. The 1973 War boosted the Egyptians confidence and support of the military 
(Middle East Policy Council, 2012).  Gamasy did not want to use the army against 
civilians, and only agreed to control the riots if Sadat decreased the cuts on commodities 
(Middle East Policy Council, 2012). Sadat agreed fearing the armed forces would take 
over the country, when in fact; the senior officers had come to tell him that the 
demonstrations had dissipated (Middle East Policy Council, 2012).  
Post-1973 not only transformed Egypt economically, but it also signified the 
strategic restructuring of foreign policy and national security (Middle East Policy 
Council, 2012).  Due to strained relation with the Soviets, Sadat was forced to open to the 
west, and when he did, it paid off. Restructuring of the military began to occur between 
1978 and 1981 (Middle East Policy Council, 2012). The armed forces were drastically 
altered so that the organizational structure would model NATO rather than that of the 
Soviet’s (Middle East Policy Council, 2012). The focus of the military also shifted from 
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purely targeting Israel, in order to leave room for examining all points of national 
security. According to Hashim,  
 
Following the Yemen debacle in the early 1960s, the officer corps was not  
too keen on doing ‘dirty police work’ in far-off places. The officer corps  
did not favor the strategic drift that afflicted the country in the late 1970s  
(Middle East Policy Council, 2012).  
 
The armed forces were relieved not to play “defender of the Arab nations”. 
Sadat’s communication with the west also opened the door for arms exchange. Following 
the Camp David accords, the Egyptian military began to be supplied with massive 
amount of sophisticated weaponry (Middle East Policy Council, 2012).  
 
MUBARAK  
 
 
When Vice President Hosni Mubarak took power following the October 6
th
, 1981 
assassination of President Anwar Sadat, much doubt surrounded Mubarak’s ability to 
successfully lead the country. Despite his thirty years in high military positions, he was 
originally seen as a man who lacked political tact and charisma compared to that of his 
predecessors. One major concern of the president immediately following the death of 
Sadat was whether the military would remain loyal to the state, or choose to follow 
Islamic radicals that had killed the former president (Hashim, 2011). The main concern 
primarily lay within the Egyptian armed forces, for it was Colonel Abboud Zumer, 
Lieutenant Khalid al-Islambouli, Sergeant Hussein Abbas Muhammad (the sniper), and 
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their cohorts who planned and carried out Sadat’s assassination motivated by religious 
extremism.
3
   
The writings of al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, then a member of the 
Islamic Jihad organization that assassinated Sadat, have illustrated the goal of the radical 
Islamic organization to not only recruit men from impoverished communities, but men 
from the military as well. In the 1970’s this recruitment became easier as a result of angry 
men from poor communities who were given false promises of “…provision of services 
and consumer goods, and job training for civilian life” upon joining the military. 4 
Recruiting men from the Egyptian military would enhance al-Qaeda’s position in 
overthrowing the so-called apostate regime.
5
 
The threat of Egyptian soldiers converting to Islamist militant Islam pushed 
Mubarak to issue an internal study for the reasons behind the growth of Islamic 
militancy, particularly within the armed forces (Hashim, 2011). However, this assessment 
was not applied to high ranking officers, who were assumed to be loyal to Mubarak’s 
regime because of the promises of early retirement and lucrative positions in military 
owned companies following their services (Hashim, 2011). The result of the state’s 
assessment of the armed forces showed that men who were more likely to be susceptible 
to the influence of Islamic extremism were those who lived in poverty or faced economic 
hardship (Wall Street Journal Online, 1986).   
                                               
3 Among the few studies that deal with extremist infiltration of the EAF, see Joseph Kechichian and Jeanne 
Nazimek, “Challenges to the Military in Egypt,” Middle East Policy 5, no. 3 (September 1, 1997); John 
Riddle, “The Egyptian Military and Fundamentalism, “ Journal of Defense and Diplomacy 4, no. 5 (May 
1986): 15-20.   
4 See Lawrence Wright. “The Rebellion Within,” New Yorker 84, no. 16 (2008). 
5 See Lawrence Wright. “The Rebellion Within,” New Yorker 84, no. 16 (2008). 
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Due to this finding, the state created an institution to prevent any infiltration of 
Islamic extremists, and to weed out those who were already present within the armed 
forces. This organization proved to be of use when military intelligence had discovered a 
scheme planned by junior and middle ranking officers who had allegedly associated 
themselves with civilians belonging to Islamic Jihad (Wall Street Journal Online, 1986). 
Many high ranking officers found the oversight group to be of little value. They believed 
that serving in the military promised a rich future that would be enough of an incentive 
for low ranking officers to remain loyal to the Egyptian armed forces.  However, only a 
handful of men would be in the position of top officers.  
The naïve thoughts of senior officials contributed to some major internal issues. 
Despite the “vast financial and human resources directed its [Egyptian military] way”, 
which will be discussed in later chapters, the institution was very inefficient (Hashim, 
2011). From the time Nasser restructured the military, the Egyptian armed forces have 
continued to struggle with low morale, insufficient training, and mediocre pay (Hashim, 
2011).   
By the 1980’s Mubarak faced a new internal threat coming from the police and 
the paramilitary. In February of 1986, 20,000 men of the paramilitary organization, 
Central Security Forces (CSF), rebelled. The purpose of the CSF, somewhat similar to the 
Basij, is to quell any demonstrations posed by students and workers. When rumors spread 
of extended service, 20,000 members of the group began to riot, causing the state to send 
in the military to reluctantly put down the rebellion.
6
 The CSF, made up of illiterate, 
poor, rural peasants who were rejected to serve in the military, were of no real danger to 
                                               
6 For details of the CSF riots see Nazih Ayubi, The State and Public Policies in Egypt since Sadat (Ithaca 
Press, 1991), 240-241. 
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the government. The CSF in northern Egypt continued to receive better benefits for their 
service while the CSF in southern Egypt (the group that rebelled) became more 
vulnerable to radical Islamic groups because of their deprived perks (Hashim, 2011).  
Unfortunately, the government was not able to learn its lesson from this event. 
The government believed that because the CSF in the south was comprised of peasants, 
there would be no need to grant the same amount of privileges for their services as other 
military organizations.   
By the 1990’s Islamic extremism, and a struggling economy, became an issue of 
national security (Hashim, 2011). Nasser and Sadat both had to deal with Islamic 
opposition. However under Mubarak’s regime, the problem became overwhelming. 
Fundamentalist groups, particularly in the south, were looking to replace the regime with 
a theocratic government. Oddly enough, the military did not take much action in 
suppressing the threat (Hashim, 2011). Although the armed forces were concerned about 
the stability of the country, their actions were limited to that of military tribunals to try 
terrorist suspects, and oversight and aid to the paramilitary organizations (Hashim, 2011). 
According to Hashim, the Egyptian armed forces traditionally show “a mark of distaste 
for dealing with domestic disturbances”. This is evident in the riots following the 
installation of the infitah, the 1986 uprising, and has shown to be correct in the 2011 
revolution (Hashim, 2011).  
Over the years, the Egyptian military developed an indirect form of 
counterinsurgency in order to combat Islamic radicals. The beginning of the 1990’s 
introduced new tactics used by the armed forces that would give them the reputation for 
being ruthless and brutish, particularly The General Directorate for State Security 
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Investigations (GDSSI), (Hashim, 2011). “Extra-judicial methods in the defense system” 
were used in to utilize various forms of torture and wire-tapping for intelligence 
gathering (Hashim, 2011). These methods were able to squash the high level of threat 
provoked by radical Islamists. Despite the success and increased budget that allowed the 
military to expand its power, the armed forces were once again in need of modernized 
equipment and organizational restructuring (Hashim, 2011).  
By the mid-2000’s Egypt’s economy was inert, and had no signs of improving. 
This affected the military’s need for advanced technology and resources, as well as the 
top officers’ desires for future lucrative positions. In 2005, suspicion arose that Mubarak 
was promoting his son to succeed him rather than appointing a deputy president, as he 
had promised (Hanna, 2009). The military looked upon this with much disdain. The 
military did not want the country to be led by hereditary rule, nor did they like the fact 
that Gamal, Mubarak’s son, had never completed his military service (Le Monde Online, 
2010). If Gamal were to become president, it would mean that senior officers would have 
competition for powerful economic positions with elite businessmen associated with 
Gamal over powerful positions of economic activity (Cambanis, 2010).      
From the beginning of Mubarak’s reign, top ranking officers enjoyed the many 
perks that came with their post. Even low and middle ranking officers were rewarded for 
their military service with access to better health care and education. However, as the 
economy crumbled, competition for lucrative positions between senior officers and their 
elite rivals intensified. Mubarak’s decision in choosing his son as his successor created a 
political struggle that would not be in accordance with the traditionally military 
dominated regime. Mubarak’s actions dissatisfied the Egyptian military in a way that 
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would lead to his demise. Of course, this needs to be examined in much more detail 
through the security, economic, and political activities of this highly influential 
organization.   
 
EGYPTIAN REVOLUTION 
 
On January 25, 2011, the Egyptian people gathered for mass demonstrations. 
Grievances against the government included corruption, police brutality, high 
unemployment, inflation of food prices, and lack of political freedom (Agence France-
Presse Online, 2011).  Participants in the massive, nonviolent protests included Egyptians 
who came from various socio-economic and religious backgrounds. Their primary goal 
and demand was to remove Mubarak from power so that a non-military regime would be 
able to take over. 
After much international pressure and domestic turmoil, Mubarak publicly 
announced his resignation on February 11
th
 of 2011. This day would be known as the 
“Friday of Departure” (Schemm & Michael, 2011).  Oddly enough, this day also 
coincided with the anniversary of the Iranian revolution of 1979. Upon Mubarak’s 
announcement, demonstrators gathered around Egyptian radio and television buildings 
while the army guarded the presidential palace, state television, and radio buildings (Al 
Jazeera Live Blogs, 2011). Following Mubarak’s resignation, Vice President Omar 
Suleiman stated: 
  
          In the name of God the merciful, the compassionate. Citizens, during  
          these very difficult circumstances Egypt is going through, President  
          Hosni Mubarak has decided to step down from the office of president of 
          the republic and has charged the high council of the armed forces to   
          administer the affairs of the country. May God help everybody  
          (Kent, 2011).    
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          The Egyptian people were so blinded by their happiness that they failed to realize 
the reincarnation of another military state.  Egyptian law scholar and diplomat, 
Mohammed El Baradei told the Associated Press, “This is the greatest day of my life. 
The country has been liberated after decades of repression,” and anticipated a 
“beautiful” transition of power (My Way News, 2011).  United States President, Barak 
Obama, even went as far as saying, “The people of Egypt have spoken, their voices 
have been heard, and Egypt will never be the same” (Kent, 2011).  
          Optimism and hope, following the overthrow of Mubarak, eclipsed the reality 
that the revolution was a mere coup. The conflict resulted in an internal takeover of the 
Egyptian military. Mubarak was the Commander of the Egyptian Air Force, and 
became president as a result of his service and high ranking position in the military. If 
the military is to overcome the political struggle with the Muslim Brotherhood, the 
military will be able to continue to wield its power over society. The tension between 
the Egyptian military and Islamic groups will be discussed in further chapters, but the 
question remains, why would the Egyptian military risk their power and control over 
the state by aiding in the oust of Mubarak?  
           As history has shown through the installation of the infitah and the 1986 
uprising, the Egyptian military has traditionally chosen not to harm their own people. 
During the demonstration in Tahrir square, the army simply made sure that weapons 
were not being transported into the area.  Meanwhile, the army accompanied a march in 
Alexandria that followed the funerals of casualties. The city had more bloodshed than 
any other throughout the revolution (ForEx Crunch, 2011).  
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           Nonetheless, there are also political reasons behind the military’s betrayal of 
Mubarak. Since the majority of the military’s personnel are conscripts and reservists, 
there is much more of an inclination towards the demonstrators than the police. If senior 
officers were to pin their men against people they sympathize with, disobedience and 
dissertation may occur within the ranks.   
           Also, the Egyptian military is highly dependent on foreign aid for equipment and 
training. The majority of their senior officers have received United States’ training and 
education. These officers understand core American military values including 
separation of police and military duties, civilian control over the military, and loyalty to 
the state versus a person, party, or ideology. The Egyptian military was fully aware of 
the international pressure for Mubarak to step down. If the military were to take action 
against civilians, it would endanger their support.  
           Once considered heroes, the Egyptian military is now an obstacle standing in the 
way of the way of democracy (whatever that may mean to the Egyptian people). 
However, as an institution that was originally supposed to “administer the affairs of the 
country”; the military and the Muslim Brotherhood are now locked in a power struggle 
over the military’s dominance and control over state interests.        
 
JOHNSON’S EMERGENCE THEORY  
 
The IRGC and the Egyptian military are complex organizations that act 
autonomously. These institutions do not rely on the political echelon, for it is the political 
echelon that needs the dominating armed forces to keep them in power. This means that 
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the relationship between these forces and the heads of government must be reciprocal, but 
not necessarily balanced.  Often times the heads of state are from a military background. 
Nonetheless, the relationship between them and these highly influential institutions is 
vital to the stability of the country, as well as the distribution of political and economic 
power between the two groups.   
The power given to these autonomous institutions is the primary factor 
contributing to the armed forces’ loyalty to their respective regime. Of course, the armed 
forces may have a genuine respect for their nation’s leader, but it is the incentives of 
political and financial gain given to these men that preserve the organization’s allure, as 
well as the power of the present government leadership.  
In order to better analyze the IRGC and the Egyptian military, Steven Johnson’s 
emergence theory will be used to identify how the armed forces operate as a unit, recruit, 
maintain their recruits, interact with other ranks, and interact with the nation’s leadership.   
 
Emergence 
The emergence theory has many names to it, including bottom-up behavior and 
collective phenomenon (Scribner, 2002). The theory describes the behavior of a system 
by breaking it down to its simple components. When the components come together, a 
complex and intelligent structure is created. Johnson approaches the theory by supporting 
it with many examples including the organization of cities and ant colonies. He describes 
the function of a city as a 
 
    …kind of pattern-amplifying machine: its neighborhoods are a way  
of measuring and expressing the repeated behavior of larger collectives –  
capturing information about group behavior, and sharing that information  
with the group. Because those patterns are fed back to the community,  
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small shifts in behavior can quickly escalate into larger movements:  
upscale shops dominate the main boulevards, while the working class  
remains clustered invisibly in the alleys and side streets; the artists live on  
the Left Bank, the investment bankers in the Eighth Arrondissement  
(Johnson, 2002).  
 
 
Johnson claims that regulations and city planners are unnecessary to create a 
bustling city, such as Manchester. “All you need are thousands of individuals and a few 
simple rules of interaction” (Johnson, 2002). This statement is supported through the 
success story of ant colonies. Every ant operates based on a set of simple rules and 
feedback from their neighbor. This translates into a functioning system consisting of ants 
building tunnels and rooms for nurseries, mating, and food storage (Blüthgen, Gebauer & 
Fiedler, 2003). The example of ant colonies leads to Johnson’s discussion of five 
fundamental principles for the emergence theory.  
The first principle is a critical amount of the component is vital for the creation 
and sustainability of any system, such as the ant colony. More ants would allow much 
more interaction, which in turn, would allow much more room for development and 
growth. One or two interactions between the ants simply cannot create a colony.  
The second is that “ignorance is useful”. The simplicity of singular components is 
beneficial to systems, such as ant colonies. Johnson states that if each individual 
component had some level of complexity, the system would not be able to effectively 
function since it would have the potential to dominate all other components. A complex 
component may be detrimental to a system.  
Thirdly, random encounters benefit the growth of a system through feedback. 
When ants interact with each other, they learn of each other’s capabilities, and as a result, 
use that knowledge to modify their behavior. For example, if there is an increase in the 
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population of ants, the ants that are in charge of storing food must adapt to the change in 
order to meet the needs of the demand.   
Fourth, there must be some sort of pattern illustrated by all the components. For 
example, ants leave behind a trail of secreted or excreted chemical known as 
pheromones. These chemicals then trigger a social response for the ants, impacting the 
behavior of the receiving individual. There are many types of these pheromones 
including food trail pheromones and sex pheromones (Medicine Net, 2012).  It is patterns 
like these that must be present between all the components in order for the system to 
function.  
Lastly, Johnson states that “local information leads to global wisdom”. This 
means it is important for individuals to be aware of their surroundings in order to learn 
certain habits and behaviors. This also means that the individual component must be able 
to alter its behavior when another component is performing a certain action. For example, 
when an ant sees that a large group of other ants are gathering food, he will change his 
action in order to better serve the colony (Johnson, 2002).  
 Similar to ants, the IRGC and the Egyptian military use these same exact 
principles to operate their system. The utilization of these principles may be either 
intentional or unintentional, but in one form or another, these principles are the gears 
behind the institution’s dominance. Upon further examination, this paper will reveal how 
whether or not these two organizations meter Johnson’s criteria for the development of a 
successful system.  
The structure of a military is hierarchal. In general, militaries represent an 
institution of professional and highly disciplined and motivated men. S.E. Finer describes 
34 
 
the military as a purposive instrument created to fulfill certain objectives; to fight and win 
wars for the defense of the state being its’ main goal (Finer, 1988). However, the unique 
structure and characteristic of a military gives the institution potential to be much more 
than an instrument used in war. It is unique in the sense that a military operates as its’ 
own society. Its’ structure gives a military organization the ability to make rapid 
decisions and effectively execute these decisions using the vast and advanced resources 
that are exclusively available to them. Military organizations generally have the ability to 
operate affairs of state, manage national projects, and resolve political upheaval.  
There is a vast amount of research that has been done on the IRGC. However, the 
research on the Egyptian military is limited. The reasons are not clear; it may be because 
the security threat of Iran prompted extensive analysis of their armed forces, or because 
its characteristics as a highly powerful and domineering force drew attention, whereas the 
Egyptian military has only recently piqued the interest of many political analysts.  For 
this reason, this paper will provide a much more in depth examination of the IRGC than 
of the Egyptian military.  
 
Application to the Egyptian Military 
 
Information about the Egyptian military is limited; however, there is enough 
research to apply the emergence theory to the workings of the institution. The 
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces is Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, 
and the Chief of Staff is Lt. Gen. Sami Hafez Anan (Global Security, 2012). The 
Egyptian Armed Forces is made up of less than one percent of Egypt's 62.4 million 
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populations (The CIA World Factbook, 2012). Each year, about 650,000 males reach 
military age. Approximately 80,000 are conscripted into the Armed Forces (Foreign 
Military Studies, 1997). From this group, the military will annually have an influence on 
12.3 per cent of Egyptian males entering the work force (Foreign Military Studies, 1997). 
Although not a significant number, it means that these men will more likely steer away 
from the influence of Islamic radicalism.   
The service length for conscripts begins after they have completed their education 
and varies depending on the level of education they have completed. This same form of 
required recruitment is used in Iran, in which some men attempt to pursue higher 
education in order to further delay their service. In Egypt, once men reach the age of 
thirty, they are seen as unfit to join the army (The CIA World Factbook, 2012). Egyptian 
men not only use education as a way to evade military service, but also traveling abroad. 
A man is also exempt from military service if he is a dual citizen. Whatever the path one 
may take to avoid this requirement, he must be able to pay a 580 dollar fine (as of 2004) 
to the government (The CIA World Factbook, 2012). This is considered as an honorable 
discharge, but is seen as offensive and cowardly.  
However, many Egyptian men cannot afford a higher education, nor have the 
ability to pay the fee. Egyptians who have completed high school serve a two year term 
of service, whereas men without a high school diploma are required to serve for three 
years (The CIA World Factbook, 2012). These recruits live in military barracks and are 
trained according to the rank they are assigned. Conscripts are only paid about ten dollars 
a month. Their pay then becomes increased to forty dollars a month after promotion to 
the next higher grade (Foreign Military Studies, 1997). And because many of the 
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conscripts come from uneducated backgrounds, the military provides literacy and 
vocational training in order to prepare the soldier for civilian employment. The recruits 
are also exposed and trained to use advanced technology ranging from weaponry to 
communications that would otherwise be unavailable to them (Foreign Military Studies, 
1997). This type of training is used to enhance economic development and nationalism, 
thereby not only enhancing the military, but the welfare of the state. When a country is 
dominated by the military, it only makes sense for the institution to train the youth 
according to their standards and values when implemented into civilian society.   
Studies of United States Army Lieutenant Colonel Stephen H. Gotowicki 
conclude that military service is a vital socialization factor in Egyptian society. Upon 
joining the military, a conscript is given the opportunity to excel in a somewhat 
egalitarian environment that provides many material benefits (Foreign Military Studies, 
1997). It is true that a soldier has the ability to be promoted through the ranks, but a 
soldier will probably gain a senior officer position only if he already has connections with 
the elite of the institution. Nonetheless, military service provides many benefits. This is 
especially important in a country that has a crumbling economy. The institution provides 
a monthly salary, medical care, sufficient food, and living accommodations. Gotowicki 
further describes the benefits of military service through a political lens stating that a 
soldier,  
…learns of a world beyond his rural agrarian origins and of a larger political  
self in a national community. This tends to be a politicizing experience  
providing the soldier with a sense of "civic" identity and loyalty to the state  
-- a world view much expanded beyond his previous exclusive reference to   
family, village and religion. Military service provides a soldier with a sense  
of citizenship, responsibility, and nationalism -- all especially important in  
the Middle East where the credibility and legitimacy of a central government 
usually diminishes rapidly as distance increases from its capital (Foreign  
Military Studies, 1997).  
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The Egyptian military will remain a socializing influence within the country if the 
armed forces continue to operate at its strength level. The economic strain has done little 
to alter the military’s spending habits (Foreign Military Studies, 1997). Since the 
institution is viewed as a deterrent for men to pursue Islamic activities or to decrease 
unemployment, the army is able to avoid the majority of the setbacks resulting from the 
struggling economy. Arguably, the military, unlike any other institution, is able to create 
a network of men who acquire the skills of work ethic, social mobility, civic 
responsibility, and nation building (Foreign Military Studies, 1997). This still applies to 
today. However, this does not persist without some sort of incentive.  Men who are 
fortunate enough to achieve a senior position can convene for the Supreme Council of the 
Armed Forces – the body to which power was transferred following Mubarak’s 
resignation in 2011. 
 
Application of Iranian Revolutionary Guards 
 
The IRGC has approximately 150,000 personnel serving functions ranging from 
internal security and external defense within their army, navy, and air force (Wright, 
2010). In order to preserve the goals of the revolution, the IRGC presides over urban and 
rural areas in order to respond quickly in any location that may exhibit civil unrest. Their 
operations in rural areas also include border control, counternarcotics, and disaster relief 
(Wehrey, et al., 2009).  The IRGC also maintains control of the development and 
deployment of weapons including ballistic missiles. If Iran gains nuclear weapons, the 
IRGC would probably be in charge of them.   
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However - on paper at least - the IRGC is subject to certain regulations, especially 
when it becomes important to distinguish the duties and capabilities of the Artesh and the 
IRGC. The necessity for these formal structures became apparent during the Iran-Iraq 
war to avoid confusion between the two institutions on the battlefield. In 1988, the 
Islamic Republic introduced the Joint Armed Forces General Staff to unite the senior 
officers of the Artesh and the IRGC. The 1989 creation of the Ministry of Defense and 
Armed Forces Logistics also decreased the IRGC’s autonomy (Wehrey, et al., 2009).   
As shown in the figure below, the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) is 
the highest ranking group within the chain of command. 
7
 It is reflective of the elites, 
consisting of powerful men such as the president, commander of Revolutionary Guards, 
defense and foreign ministers, and “representatives” of the Supreme Leader. However, 
the SNSC does not wield much independent power. Ayatollah Khamenei has complete 
command over this council, and is given this right through constitutional power (Wehrey, 
et al., 2009).  As stated previously, the SNSC contains the Supreme Leader’s 
representatives, who speak on behalf of his interests, always outweighing the opinions of 
other members within the group. Currently, Foreign Minister Ali Larijani and Hassan 
Rowhani serve as Khamenei’s special envoys (Wehrey, et al., 2009).  Representatives of 
Khamenei are not only present within the SNSC, but within most groups of the armed 
forces hierarchy. When it comes to national and foreign policy decision making, 
individuals are usually valued more than institutions (Wehrey, et al., 2009).   
Two other security organizations rank directly below the SNSC, including the 
Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) and the Ministry of Interior. Heyder 
                                               
7 This figure is located on p. 9 in The Rise of the Pasdaran: Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran’s Islamic 
Revolutionary Guard Corps.   
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Moslehi is the current commander of the MOIS, in which it is a secret police agency 
similar to the Shah’s Sāzemān-e Ettelā'āt va Amniyat-e Keshvar, or  
SAVAK. 
8
 The MOIS is a well funded agency that is notorious for carrying out 
assassinations of dissident Iranians who live abroad and within the country (Wehrey, et 
al., 2009). One of their most infamous murder sprees occurred in late 1998, when the 
agency assassinated three dissident writers, a political leader, and his wife in the span of 
two months (BBC News Online, 2003). 
As a powerful institution, the IRGC views MOIS as a competitor. Under the 
umbrella of the IRGC exists the Qods Force, a group specialized in the export of the 
values of the revolution. In a 1998 document written by the Federation of American 
Scientists, the mission of the Qods Force is to organize, train, equip, and finance foreign 
Islamic revolutionary movements (Wehrey, et al., 2009).  The research of this document 
has also found that the Qods Force maintains and builds communications with Islamic 
organizations all across the globe.    
The Qods Force is extremely disciplined, and under the direct control of 
Khameini. Similar to the MOIS, the Qods carry out murder for the preservation of Islam. 
However, unlike the MOIS, the Qods also carry out various types of attacks in order to 
expand Islam. Allegations against the Qods have been made regarding the 2007 Karbala 
Provincial Joint Coordination Center attack. A group of gunmen were captured by 
Americans after successfully passing an Iraqi checkpoint around 5:00pm disguised as 
American diplomats and militants speaking fluent English (CNN Online, 2007). Due to 
the elaborate and detailed manner of the attack, many analysts have suggested that only 
the Qods could be capable of executing such an action (Wehrey, et al., 2009).  Unlike the 
                                               
8 The translation of this title is National Intelligence and Security Organization.  
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MOIS, the Qods lack much independence. They are controlled tightly within the 
hierarchy of the IRGC, as well as that of Iran’s Security Establishment.     
 
Figure 1 – Iran’s National Security Establishment. Source: Wehrey et al., The Rise of the 
Pasdaran: Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, 
2009.  
 
Another organization competing with the IRGC is the subordinate group of the 
Ministry of the Interior known as the Law Enforcement Forces (LEF). The LEF contains 
about 120,000 personnel (Wehrey, et al., 2009).  This task force is responsible for a 
variety of duties including counternarcotics, border patrol, anticorruption, and riot control 
(Wehrey, et al., 2009). The functions of the LEF have the tendency to overlap with the 
Basij. The duties of the Basij also include responsibilities such as riot control and 
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anticorruption. Nonetheless, because the LEF is viewed as an inefficient and 
undisciplined group, the Basij is the force that is relied upon for such matters. However, 
when former IRGC Air Force commander Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf was appointed as 
the LEF’s new chief, the force was able to improve its discipline, weapon inventory, and 
policing capabilities (Wehrey, et al., 2009).         
  It is important to note that the figure above is not an accurate portrayal of 
the balance of power among these forces (Wehrey, et al., 2009). Iran’s government is 
based on an informal network of power, and political influence determines the power of 
organizations. Within the bureaucratic structures of Iran, a network must be established 
before a person can even think about advancing to any sort of position. And because the 
IRGC has always had a close knit relationship with the Supreme Leaders, Khomeini and 
Khamenei, men who are or have been well established in the institution have been able to 
saturate the Iranian military. According to the authors of, The Rise of the Pasdaran, the 
IRGC’s domestic ascendency is encouraged by the Iran’s complex political structure.  
Because this built-in redundancy has multiple centers of power, and because  
it relies on a ponderous process of checks and balances among different organizations, 
there is a default drift toward ‘behind-the scenes’ bargaining  
and informal network (Wehrey, et al., 2009).          
 
 
Thus, the figure shows the formal structure of the Iranian military and IRGC. However, 
behind that structure exists an informal network that completely dominates the 
bureaucratic system.  
The hierarchy within the Egyptian military is like that of any other military. The 
structure may be similar, but their power over the state economically, politically, and 
socially is one that cannot be ignored. The military chooses to support the head of state if 
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he does not go against the interests of the military. As noted previously, rumors spread 
about Mubarak choosing his son to be his successor. This was a political move that went 
against the Egyptian military, and consequently, the institution found this to be one of the 
many reasons to abandon Mubarak.  
However, the hierarchy of Iran’s Armed Forces is very different compared to 
almost any existing military institution. Whereas Egypt’s forces are comprised of one 
united body, Iran has two – the IRGC and the military. Although the Iranian military is 
controlled by veteran members of the IRGC, the complexity of its bureaucracy ensures 
corruption, back-handed dealing, and tension within the government. For the Iranian 
government, it is much easier to play into the prideful and esteemed character of Iranian 
men. 
The majority of Iranian men hold themselves to high standards and is willing to 
be part of a corrupt system if it means reaping considerable benefits. Egyptian men also 
carry the same trait. For whatever reason, pride is an attribute that is held very highly 
within middle-eastern culture, which plays right into the recruitment process, and the 
maintaining of recruits. The financial incentives provided to Egyptians serving in the 
military and IRGC members, especially during a time of economic distress, is a strong 
asset in providing the respect and regard from peers. This mentality and the incentives 
provided encourage men to commit themselves to further service rather than just serving 
the mandatory amount.  
The third chapter will discuss the economic role and advancements of both these 
institutions. Also, in further analyzing the Egyptian military and IRGC, Johnson’s five 
principles of his emergence theory will be applied to the forces inner workings.  
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POPULARIZATION OF IRGC 
 
As previously mentioned, the IRGC was founded following the Iranian 
revolution. This armed force was created to counter any opposition to the new regime, 
especially military men who may have still been loyal to the shah. The shah’s military 
had been supported by the United States, so was viewed with extreme suspicion by the 
regime. The original role and purpose of the IRGC was to protect the values of the 
revolution, which also included repelling Saddam Hussein’s forces in the Iran-Iraq War 
in 1980. Iran’s victory established the IRGC as a revered institution, as well as the 
primary internal and external security force. It is argued that the IRGC prolonged the war 
due to its inexperience and ideological commitment, However, the IRGC continues to use 
success against Iraq to boost its credibility as the country’s “holy defender” (Wright, 
2010).  
As the IRGC became more relied upon, it received an increase in funds. Its’ 
structure paralleled the Artesh, in that it operated as an efficient and independent land, 
sea, and air force. The IRGC eclipses the Artesh. It is unique in that it runs asymmetric 
warfare through the Qods force and radical Islamic organizations, such as Hezbollah. The 
IRGC is also in charge of expanding missile forces and commanding the nuclear arsenal, 
if Iran is to gain this capability (Wright, 2010).         
The first mandated roles of the IRGC were domestic intelligence collection and 
suppression of dissent that opposed Khomeini’s mission (Wehrey, et al., 2009). The 
suppression of one these groups in the early days of the regime included the Mujahedin-e 
Khalq-e Iran Organization (MEK). The MEK was originally a leftist group founded in 
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1965.
9
  The group supported the revolution, but ended up splitting with the theocrats 
(Wright, 2010). Recently investigative journalist Seymour Hersh published an article 
stating that the United States has been training the MEK in Nevada – contradicting the 
denials (Hersh, 2012).  United States military and intelligence officials detest Hersh 
because of his deep sources, and usually never inaccurate in his findings.  The MEK now 
claims to be the main opposition to the regime.  
According to the 2010 Edition of the Iran Primer, the Guards forces is now up to 
150,000 men divided between land, sea, and air forces. The IRGC land forces are 
estimated to be between 100,000 and 125,000, while the navy is as many as 20,000 and 
the Qods, around 5,000. The Basij also has the ability to mobilize hundreds of thousands 
of men in the event of a national security threat (Wright, 2010).  
Although accusations of funding terrorist organizations has repeatedly been 
denied by the government, the IRGC has trained and equipped proxy groups such as 
Hamas, Hezboallah, Iraqi Shiite insurgents, and even parts of the Taliban in the event war 
is to break out with Israel or the United States (Wright, 2010). The IRGC specializes in is 
asymmetric warfare. This training is taught to the IRGC by the Qods force.  
The IRGC’s navy has also developed a naval strategy in the event asymmetric 
warfare is to break out. According to the Iran Primer; 
 
The Guards have hundreds of fast attack boats, anti-ship cruise missiles,  
                                               
9 Mujahedin-e Khalq-e Iran means the People’s Mujahedin of Iran. The letter, e, following the two words is 
a sound in Farsi used to connect words together. It is not exclusively part of the word. The organization was 
founded by university students who intended to create a political movement of Islamists and Marxists. 
MEK was originally devoted to fighting capitalism and imperialism existing within the shah’s regime. 
When Khomeini took power, the MEK attempted to fight with the IRGC against the authority of Islamic 
law. MEK was the largest opposition group since the post election protests of 2009. Today, the MEK has 
fizzled out, but  continues to operate in locations such as Iraq. See Our Men in Iran? by Seymour M. Hersh 
from The New Yorker .     
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and naval mines. Together they impede U.S. operations in the Gulf, disrupt shipping, and 
impose a painful cost on U.S. forces in the event of an armed conflict. The Guards also 
operate hundreds of ballistic missiles that can  
target U.S. forces stationed in Gulf Cooperation Council countries, in addition  
to Israel and beyond (Wright, 2010).  
 
  
The IRGC has not only eclipsed the Artesh in respect to coercive forces, but have 
also eclipsed them in intelligence security in scope and authority. This became even more 
apparent following the 2009 demonstrations (Wright, 2010). 
As the IRGC gained more and more power, the competition with forces under the Artesh 
has grown. This type of rivalry has led to lack of communication of cooperation between 
the two organizations.  
 
ARTESH AND IRGC RIVALRY 
 
 
Although the distinction between the IRGC and Artesh is blurred due to the fact 
that the leadership positions within the Artesh are given to veteran members of the IRGC, 
power struggles between the two institutions continue.  Following the success of 
dismantling and eliminating opposition organizations such as the Forghan 
10
 and 
Communist Tudeh Party, 
11
  the IRGC stepped back from its’ intelligence duties, and 
                                               
10 Forghan is the Persian word for Koran. The Forghan was an Islamic terrorist group that formed in 1979, 
and committed a series of assassinations against the clergy of the Islamic Republic. Not much research can 
be found about the Forghan Party, but it has become a very weak organization resulting from crackdowns 
by the IRGC. much research can be found about the Forghan Party, but it has become a very weak 
organization resulting from crackdowns by the IRGC.  
 
11 The Communist Tudeh Party was founded in 1941 following the British-Soviet Allied invasion of Iran. It 
formed into a radical leftist party, in which members called for Iran to be part of the Soviet Union. They 
played a considerable role in Mohammad Mosaddeq's campaign to nationalize the Anglo-Iranian Oil 
Company. The party still exists today, but it much weaker as a result of crackdowns by the IRGC.  See 
Tortured Confessions: Prisons and Public Recantations in Modern Iran by Ervand Abrahamian, University 
of California Press, 1999. 
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gave the MOIS back its authority over its’ intelligence services (Khaleigh, 2006). 
However, this did not last for long.  
When reformist President Mohammed Khatami was elected in 1997, the IRGC 
began to once again include intelligence collection under its umbrella of authority 
(Khaleigh, 2006). Khatami appointed Hojatolislam Ali Younessi as Minister for 
Intelligence and Security. This appointment created a potential threat for the regime, for 
Younessi led the MOIS down a path that was tolerant of Khatami’s reformist policies and 
ambitions (Iranian Students News Agency, 2004). The reform dominated department led 
Khomeini to revive the IRGC’s former activity in intelligence collection and internal 
security (Wehrey, et al., 2009). The majority of men within the network were 
conservatives who modeled their intelligence department from the IRGC’s ground forces 
(Khaligh, 2006). 
The balance of internal security departments was once again altered when 
Ahmadinejad won the presidency seat in 2005. As a hardliner, Ahmadinejad sought to 
eradicate reformists within the government. Ahmadinejad appointed Hojatolislam 
Ghomlamhussein Mohseni-Ejehi as head of the MOIS, who proved to be of good use, 
through the MOIS’s widespread suppression of civil liberties and intellectual freedoms 
(Farhi, 2007).              
Currently, the security division of intelligence of the IRGC functions like a 
regular intelligence department; collecting information on opponents, arresting 
individuals, and imprisoning them in IRGC facilities (Wehrey, et al., 2009). The activity 
is, more likely than not, conducted under the direction of Hojattolislam Saeedi, the 
Supreme Leader’s representative. Khamenei is known for his scrupulous management 
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style, especially pertaining to the operations of the IRGC, and because he has the 
constitutional right to bypass the senior IRGC officers, the Supreme Leader is able to 
directly supervise the workings of the institution (Wehrey, et al., 2009). 
The rivalry between the MOIS and the Qods Force, as well as the Basij and the 
LEF were discussed in chapter one in order to establish the structure of Iran’s National 
Security Establishment. The competition between the two institutions is apparent, but in 
no way hinders the capabilities and efficiency of the IRGC. It is even difficult to separate 
the Artesh and the IRGC considering the leadership of the Artesh consists of IRGC 
veterans. However, when senior officials are assigned to leadership positions within the 
Artesh, a power struggle can ensue, with the IRGC to receiving the favorable outcome. 
In the 33 years of the existence of the Islamic regime, the IRGC has become 
progressively more powerful within all sectors of society. It has complete control over the 
Iranian military, and begs the question for the existence of the institution if the IRGC has 
completely dominated it. Since the IRGC views the Artesh with little respect, cooperation 
and communication between the two institutions is limited, and, as a result, creates 
confusion and an overlap of operations that wastes time and money. However, if 
Khameini were to abolish the Artesh, criticism of Iran’s human rights violations would 
become heightened. The existence of a regular army, the Artesh can somewhat obscure 
the fact that Iran is run by an Islamic militant organization.  
Another reason may be the fact that Khamenei does not want to bother 
reorganizing his armed forces. This is known as path dependency. It is the term used to 
describe how a specific circumstance is limited by the decisions one has made in the past, 
even though the past circumstance may be rendered as irrelevant (Praeger, 2011). 
49 
 
Although having two institutions is inefficient, restructuring and adapting to a 
reorganized body is an issue that is probably far from Khamenei’s priorities.             
  
 The Egyptian military has a far less complex and confusing bureaucracy than 
Iran’s National Security Establishment. Egypt’s military does not have competing 
branches, nor does it have auxiliary forces, like the Basij. Nonetheless, what the Egyptian 
military lacks is the glue that binds them to the head of state. Although there may be great 
competition within the Iranian armed forces, one shared commonality between the forces 
is their reverence for Khamenei. He is known to be the careful thinker, and consensus 
builder that many Iranians respect (The Compendium, 2012).  The rivalries do exist, but 
IRGC and Artesh members uphold Islamic values, and would be gracious to the leader 
who maintains them.  
 
BASIJ FORCES 
 
Jafari's appointment under Ahmadinejad proved to be an important development 
in the structural dynamics of the Guards. In a September 2007 speech, he identified the 
IRGC's current role, stating: 
The Revolutionary Guards are not a one dimensional military organization.  
The mission of the Guards is guarding the revolution and its achievements against 
internal threats … The current strategy, which has been clarified by  
the leadership of the revolution, differs from the strategies of the [war] years.  
The main mission of the Guards today is countering internal threats  
(Hamshahri, 2007). 
 
 
 Jafari’s statement has proved to be correct. When the 2009 post-election uprising 
occurred, it was the IRGC that deployed the Basij to suppress the movement. The IRGC 
has the capability and the manpower to expand their responsibilities to further horizons. 
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Although it can be argued that the description and purpose of the IRGC would require 
them to undertake the suppression of an uprising, this responsibility usually falls under 
the task of the Iranian Police Force.  
 The Basij’s official title is the Basij-e Mostaz'afin, meaning “mobilization of the 
oppressed”. The force was created on November 25, 1979, when Khomeini called for a 
“twenty million man army” to defend the Islamic regime (Wright, 2010). Under Article 
151 of the constitution the government is obligated to: 
 
provide a program of military training, with all requisite facilities, for all  
its citizens, in accordance with the Islamic criteria, in such a way that all  
citizens will always be able to engage in the armed defense of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran (Wright, 2010).  
 
  
 Over the years, the Basij has expanded into a force intervening in politics. 
Initially, the Basij was used to assist the IRGC in maintaining law and order within 
various cities. 
12
 However, when the Iran-Iraq began, the auxiliary military transformed 
into a combat force fighting alongside the IRGC and Iranian military (Wright, 2010). 
According to the Iran Primer, the Basij were often used in “human wave” tactics. 13 
Although inexperienced, the Basij was large at the time of the war. In December of 1986, 
the participation of the Basij volunteers peaked at about 100,000 men (Wright, 2010).  
 When the war ended in 1988, the Basij’s main commitment was to post-war 
reconstruction. However with the political reform movement in the 1990’s, the duties of 
the Basij returned to overseeing and suppressing political dissident activities, particularly 
within the student and female population (Wright, 2010).  
                                               
12 This included fighting against separatist groups such as the Kurdish, Turkoman, and Baluchi minority.  
 
13 This is an offensive tactic, in which the attacker(s) participate in an unprotected frontal assault in an 
attempt to overrun the enemy line.    
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 The Basij played a pivotal role in suppressing the Green Movement. They were 
able to counteract demonstrations in universities, factories, and on the streets. However, 
there was much disinclination to participate in using force against the protestors (Wright, 
2010). Basij members reportedly abandoned their post when commanded to beat and 
harass fellow students for participating in the demonstrations (Wright, 2010). As a result, 
the IRGC was forced to move basiji (individual members) far from their neighborhoods 
in order to prevent the basiji from deserting their responsibilities (Wright, 2010).  
 The IRGC has only recently obtained formal control over the Basij. In 2007 the 
IRGC was given complete authority over the Basij, under Khamenei’s overall command 
(Wright, 2010). In 2008, the Basij were incorporated into the IRGC’s ground forces unit 
(Wright, 2010). Before the formal incorporation of the Basij, a rivalry existed between the 
two groups during the Iran-Iraq War.
14
 In 1981, the Basij was part of the IRGC, but 
operated as a somewhat independent entity.   
 The Basij is complex. It has its own structure and operates as its own society. It is 
a very culturally diverse organization because the structure is designed for men of the 
same region to operate within their own communities. Thus, there is a culture and 
socialization behind being a member. For men in Iran, the Basij is a way of life. The 
auxiliary force divides each city in Iran depending on its size and population, into 
districts called resistance areas. Resistance areas are divided into resistance zones, which 
are further divided into resistance bases, and the bases into groups (Wright, 2010).  
 According to the Iran Primer, the Basij is also composed of three branches in 
which men of the same background, age, or experience are usually placed together. The 
three branches include: 
                                               
14 See the Memoirs of a Pragmatic Ayatollah: The Record and Memoirs of Hashemi Rafsanjani. 
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  Ashoura and Al-Zahra Brigades – “security and military branch tasked with ‘defending 
the neighborhoods in case of emergencies’ ”. 
  Imam Hossein Brigades – “composed of Basij war veterans who cooperate closely 
with the IRGC ground forces”. 
  Imam Ali Brigades – “deal with security threats”. 
 
 The force also has multiple branches with specialized functions. They include: 
 Basij of the Guilds [Basij-e Asnaf] 
 Labor Basij [Basij-e Karegaran] 
 Basij of the Nomads [Basij-e Ashayer] 
 Public Servants' Basij [Basij-e Edarii] 
 Pupil's Basij [Basij-e Danesh-Amouzi] 
 Student Basij [Basij-e Daneshjouyi] 
15
 
Since basiji members share a commonality within their branch, it creates an atmosphere 
that is unmatched by the IRGC. The purpose of the subordination of the Basij to the 
IRGC was a calculated move in order to create a “brotherhood” environment in the IRGC 
similar to that of the Basij. Each branch of the Basij above is established as a 
counterweight to non-governmental organizations (Wright, 2010). For example the Labor 
Basij is the counterpart to labor unions.  
  Before one becomes a member of the IRGC, he usually has experience as a 
member of the Basij, for example Ahmadinejad. The age of Basij members ranges from 
high school age to mid-30s (Wright, 2010). Benefits of being a basiji include priority in 
entering a university, access to jobs, and health benefits. Members are selected by “clergy 
                                               
15 The list of branches is directly taken from Wright, Robin, The Iran Primer: Power, Politics, and U.S. 
Policy. 2010.   
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of the neighborhoods and trusted citizens and legal associations of the neighborhoods” 
(Wright, 2010). According to the Iran Primer there are three different types of members: 
 
  Regular members, “who are mobilized in wartime and engage in developmental 
activities in peacetime. Regular members are volunteers and are unpaid, unless they 
engage in war-time duty”. 
  
  Active Members, “who have had extensive ideological and political indoctrination, and 
who also receive payment for peacetime work”.  
 
  Special Members, “who are paid dual members of the Basij and the IRGC and serve as 
the IRGC ground forces”. 16 
     
The mosque is used as the recruiting center, where volunteers can apply for various 
positions within the Basij. Members are also not limited to men. Member may also 
include women, and Iranians of almost all ages who perform tasks other necessary tasks 
(Wright, 2010).   
 
IRGC PARTICIPATION IN THE GREEN MOVEMENT 
 
The security role of the IRGC dominated the efforts of the Green Movement. 
Although protestors were high in numbers, their strategic, non-violent demonstrations 
failed to deliver. With the exception of some Basij, IRGC members were not reluctant to 
carry out violence. This will become clearer in chapters three and four when the reasons 
behind the IRGC’s loyalty will be elaborated.  
A series of uprisings occurred in Tehran immediately following the June 12
th
 
2009 presidential election, in which police officials ended up arresting over 170 people 
(BBC News Online, 2009). Among the arrested were intellectuals and well-known 
reformist politicians. These included Behzad Nabavi, founder of the Mojahedin of the 
                                               
16 The list of branches is directly taken from Wright, Robin, The Iran Primer: Power, Politics, and U.S. 
Policy. 2010.   
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Islamic Revolution Organization (MIRO), 
17
  Iran Islamic Participation Front (IIPF) 
18
 
leader Mohsen Mirdamadi, and the brother of former president Khatami, Mohammad-
Reza Khatami (Worth & Fathi, 2009).  
In a confrontation with Univeristy of Tehran students, the police detained 
approximately 200 people, while Basij members shot their guns into the crowd (Tait, 
2009). The majority would later be released after admitting their wrongdoing on national 
television.   
On June 14
th
, acting Police Chief Ahmad-Reza Radan stated on national media 
that “in the interrogation of related rebels, we [Intelligence Ministry] intend to find the 
link between the plotters and foreign media” (Keller, 2009). This investigation later 
turned into a crackdown and removal of reform oriented individuals. According to 
relatives of detainees, prisoner interrogation was being headed by Saeed Mortazavi, a 
man notorious for cruel and ruthless interrogation and torture techniques (Booth & Hider, 
2009).  
 
Khamenei’s second eldest son, Mojtaba, has played a major role in purging 
reformists and dissidents within the government. He is well respected by both his father 
and Ahmadinejad, and is even said to be the Supreme Leader’s possible successor 
(Borger, 2009).  
By August 11, 2008, the Iranian government claimed to have detained 4,000 
Iranians relating to opposition activity (BBC News Online, 2009). In statements by 
various dissident leaders, including presidential candidate Mehdi Karroubi, claims were 
                                               
17 MIRO is a small reformist group, known to be composed of radical intellectuals who are mild mannered 
in nature. See Abrahamian, Ervand, History of Modern Iran, Columbia University Press, 2008. 
18 IIPF is a reformist organization that supports an Islamic regime, yet is opposed to its totalitarian rule, 
advocating for a democratic Iran.  Mohammad-Reza Khatami was once the leader of the party. 
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made of prisoners forced to endure broken bones, torture of torn finger nails, and rape 
(Fletcher, 2009). The death toll resulting from confrontation between protestors and 
security forces is also unclear. The Iranian government is quite talented in preventing 
information to be leaked, and situations that would further tarnish the reputation of the 
country to be investigated. Nonetheless, the government has admitted to 27 causalities 
documented by hospital records, but refuses to investigate further (CNN News Online, 
2009).    
Throughout the protests members of the IRGC and Basij would break into homes 
and university dorms, destroying property in order to instill fear within the Iranian 
people. Tactics used by the Basij force against protestors have been described as 
choosing “targets at the edges of the crowds, going for the vulnerable and unwary 
stragglers,” attacking “surreptitiously ... jumping demonstrators as they return home on 
darkened streets at night,” (Anderson, 2009) and applying "tiny knives or razor blades to 
use against protestors from behind their backs” (Leyne, 2009).  
However, as mentioned earlier, some Basij members did not have the heart to 
follow IRGC commands to carry out violence against their fellow Iranians.  Due to lack 
of Basij willingness to participate, the IRGC had to expand its own role in quelling the 
demonstrations. 
EGYPTIAN MILITARY PARTICIPATION IN REVOLUTION  
Despite being known as a “non-violent” revolt, the Egyptian revolution saw 
violent and deadly clashes between police officers and protestors. One of the first protests 
occurred on the 25
th
 of January 2011, known as the “Day of Anger”. The mass protests 
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that occurred in cities across Egypt, including Cairo and Suez, were purposefully 
organized to coincide with Egypt’s National Police Day (BBC News Online, 2011).  
 Demonstrations occurred in front of the Ministry of Interior in order to protest 
against police abuse, as well as other gripes such as government corruption, 
unemployment, and the use of emergency law. Upon confrontation with the police, two 
protesters in Suez died (BBC News Online, 2011).
 
Meanwhile in the center of Cairo, thousands attended a demonstration located in 
front of the High Court. Due to the high number, protestors were able to break through 
the security cordon and advance into Tahrir Square (Al Dustour Online, 2011). 
Approximately 15,000 protestors were occupying Tahrir Square, leading police to use 
tear gas and water cannons to suppress the movement (Almasry Alyoum Online, 2011). 
However, this proved to be unsuccessful when protestors threw stones at police, causing 
the armed force to retreat (Leyne, 2011). 
On January 27
th
 the Muslim Brotherhood declared its allegiance to the protestors. 
In Suez, the continuation of protests led to an increase in violence, in which some of the 
protestors began to arm themselves with guns (Al Jazeera Online, 2011).  According to 
the Australian tabloid, the Herald Sun, hundreds were arrested at various protests. About 
600 were arrested in Cairo, and more than 120 protestors, the majority being Muslim 
Brotherhood members, were arrested in Asyut (Herald Sun Online, 2011). 
 However, on the following day, the police no longer had the man power or the 
equipment to suppress the mass riots. This particular day is known as the “Friday of 
Anger”, in which hundreds of thousands of Egyptians emerged into the streets following 
Friday prayers (Sullivan, 2011). Police responded by using rubber bullets, water cannons, 
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and tear gas in an attempt to quell the mass demonstration (CNN World, 2011). 
Nevertheless, the violence of the protestors escalated throughout Egypt. 
 In Suez, protestors seized a police station, freed arrested protestors, and set fire to 
a nearby, local police station. Similar chaos occurred in Port Said, where multiple 
government buildings were set on fire (Al Jazeera, 2011). Amid reports of looting, the 
disorder in Egypt raised concerns about the safety of the valuable antiquities in the 
Egyptian Museum. In order to protect the museum, army commandos were called upon 
(Blair, 2011).  
 This day of utter chaos forced the state to deploy the army. The army was 
deployed to Cairo, Suez, and Alexandria, in order to assist police (CBS News Online, 
2011). However, specifically in Suez and Alexandria, the military expressed the desire to 
avoid confrontation with protestors (AsiaNews.it, 2011).  
 Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, Egypt's Minister of Defense and Commander in 
Chief of the Egyptian Armed Forces, was seen among the protesters in Tahrir Square, as 
was Egyptian law scholar and diplomat and recent head of the International Atomic 
Energy Agency, Mohamed Mustafa El Baradei (Egypt Independent, 2011). El Baradei 
announced to demonstrators:  
 
What we [Egyptian protestors] have begun cannot go back…You are  
the owners of this revolution. You are the future. Our key demand is  
the departure of the regime and the beginning of a new Egypt in which  
each Egyptian lives in virtue, freedom and dignity (Hendawi &Michael, 2011).  
 
 
From the time the army was called out to suppress the regime it was clear that 
their only intent would be to protect the people. On January 30
th
 Mubarak held a meeting 
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with military commanders in order to discuss solutions to ending the chaos that had 
erupted in Egypt (Salama, 2011). 
When ordered, soldiers refused to use live ammunition on the people. The army 
chief announced to protesters the army’s support, but despite their backing, violence all 
across Egypt became rampant (Al Jazeera, 2011). The police were losing an uphill battle, 
and as a result, many disappeared from their posts, either because they feared for their 
own lives, became frustrated with their efforts, and/or supported protestors. This became 
especially problematic in Cairo, for violence escalated there more in than other cities. 
Looters continued to take advantage of the disorder caused by the revolution, in one case, 
ransacking the Arkadia shopping mall (Al Jazeera Live Stream, 2011).    
This made the military’s security role that much more crucial. Nonetheless, senior 
Egyptian generals led by Tantawi released a statement saying: 
 
The armed forces will not resort to use of force against our great people.  
Your armed forces, who are aware of the legitimacy of your demands and  
are keen to assume their responsibility in protecting the nation and the  
citizens, affirms that freedom of expression through peaceful means is guaranteed to 
everybody (Nakhoul, 2011). 
  
  
From February 1
st
 to the 3, 2011, the violence reached a new level in Cairo, 
known as the “Camel Battle” (Weaver et al., 2011). Pro-Mubarak supporters, who were 
more likely than not sent by Mubarak’s National Democratic Party, attacked protestors 
with swords, whips, clubs, stones, rocks, and pocket knives, while on horse or camelback 
(Ackerman, 2011). Some security officials were witnessed bribing ordinary citizens into 
attacking protesters (Al Jazeera Live Blog, 2011). Clashes between the protestors and 
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Mubarak’s supporters would viciously continue up until the president’s departure. An 
Interior Ministry spokesman stated in reference to the encounters: 
   
The army remains neutral and is not taking sides because if we protect  
one side we will be perceived as biased....our role is to prevent clashes  
and chaos as we separate the opposing groups (Ahmed et al.). 
 
 
  
According to the Egyptian health ministry, the confrontation from the two 
opposing groups left 13 people dead and 1,200 injured. Civil disobedience and mass 
protests would continue to occur resulting in few deaths usually caused by gunshot 
wounds from both police and protestors. On February 11
th, known as the “Friday of 
Departure”, Suleiman announced Mubarak's resignation and the transitional leadership 
appointed to the Supreme Council of Egyptian Armed Forces (Schemm &Michael, 
2011). Nationwide celebrations arose upon the release of the news. 
However, once the military resumed power, protestors claimed that their demands 
were not being met. They claimed that the military was stalling the process of creating a 
new government, and as a result, feared a regime under military rule. Since the military 
took over the leadership position of Egypt, protestors resumed demonstration activity.  
One particular demonstration caused the death of at least 25 people, and injured 
more than 200 (Fahmy, 2011). On October 9
th
, a peaceful protest, predominately staged 
by Egyptian Copts 
19
 held in Maspiro, called for the dissolution of the Supreme Council 
of the Armed Forces, and resignation of Tantawi (Knell, 2011). This turned violent when 
                                               
19 Egyptian Copts are Egyptian Christians who are often subject to discrimination and attacks by radical 
Islamic groups.  
60 
 
military police began attacking the protestors. According to the Egyptian military, it was 
the Egyptian Copts who initiated the violent episode.   
Despite protests against the military, the institution continues to have a stronghold 
over Egypt. The Egyptian military is unlikely to turn over their power to a government 
that will limit theirs. More likely than not, the Egyptian military will choose a leader or 
candidates for the presidency that will suit the interests of the institution, and the people 
within the institution. He may be a member of the military, or a man who is willing to be 
subject to the military. In any case, the same type of system, government, and inner 
workings of the government will most likely continue.  
However, the military also must be able meet the demands of the people to some 
extent. This should include constitutional changes and economic reforms. Improvements 
that will directly and obviously affect the Egyptian people, will give the military a 
credible reputation as a security force. 
While the military has the potential to come out as the “hero” of the revolution, 
the police have tarnished their prestige as an honorable and feared security force. 
According to one source the Egyptian police:  
 
Once feared by civilians, are now seen as leftover elements of Mubarak’s  
regime and treated with little respect. Pulled off the streets after violently cracking down 
on protests in January, they are now trying to reshape their  
role in the post-Mubarak Egypt (Lynch, 2011). 
 
Following the ouster of Mubarak, protestors demanded that Interim Interior 
Minister Mansour al-Essawy purge up to 700 corrupt senior police officers in response to 
the killings during the Egyptian Revolution. However, protesters complained that only 
one officer has been convicted of foul play, and still has yet been incarcerated (Shenker, 
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2011). According to writer Ahdaf Soueif, since 2005 the police have notoriously been 
known for routinely grabbing female protesters to tear “their clothes off and beat them, 
groping them at the same time. The idea was to insinuate that females who took part in 
street protests wanted to be groped” (Soueif, 2011). As a result, the military has made it a 
priority to revive the demoralization and public perception of the police (Lynch, 2011). 
JOHNSON’ PRINCIPLES APPLIED 
This chapter does not speak much to the inner workings of the Egyptian military 
or IRGC. However, it does illustrate the security role the institutions played within the 
rebellions, and highlights the first principle of Johnson’s theory; an increased amount of a 
component leads to a better chance of sustainability. The Basij in particular were greatly 
responsible for suppressing the 2009 post-election uprisings. The expanding force is 
becoming increasingly more efficient since the accumulation of members allows room 
for growth and development.  
The increase in numbers within the Egyptian military and IRGC has led to the 
creation of a much more complex institution that is deeply entrenched in all facets of 
society. This will be explored in more detail within the following two chapters. 
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IRGC IN THE ECONOMIC SECTOR 
 
The IRGC’s involvement in the Iranian economy first began during Ayatollah 
Rafsanjani’s presidency. After ten years of war with Iraq, one of Rafsanjani’s major 
priorities was to reconstruct the badly damaged economy. The IRGC was the only 
institution that had the manpower and the resources to initiate such a challenging task 
(Wright, 2010). It can also be argued that by using the IRGC to participate in economic 
reforms, he would be able to win their approval, for Rafsanjani’s government encouraged 
the IRGC to use economic activities to increase its budget (Sazegara, 2006).   
 Over the next 30 years, the IRGC grew into the largest economic institution 
(Wright, 2010). The organization is involved in almost every industry from banking and 
energy production to auto-making and construction. From the beginning of their 
economic dominance, the IRGC used abandoned warehouses to create the moavenat 
bassazi (headquarters of self-sufficiency) and moavenat khodkafaee (headquarters of 
reconstruction). These two headquarters blossomed into various companies specializing 
in areas such as mining and agriculture (Khaligh, 2006).   
 In 1990, the headquarters became known as, gharargah khatam alanbia, the army 
base of Khatam al-Aniba (Wehrey et al., 2009).
20
 It expanded to specialize in wide 
variety of fields including, “agriculture, industry, mining, road building, transportation, 
import, export, education, and culture” (Gharargah-e Sazandegiye Khatam al-Aniba, 
2011).  
 Khatam al-Aniba has evolved into “one of Iran’s largest contractors in industrial 
and development projects, and is considered the IRGC’s major engineering arm…” 
                                               
20 Khatam al-Aniba literally means “Seal of the Prophets” in Arabic. 
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About 25,000 employees work at the headquarters, in which ten percent are IRGC 
members and the rest are contractors. However, this does not mean that the contractors 
are not IRGC members or veterans of the IRGC. Many IRGC veterans have become 
involved in the civilian sector.  
 The Ministry of Oil, Transportation, and Energy, and the mayor of Tehran have 
cooperated with the IRGC through Khatam al-Aniba, in order to accomplish such tasks as 
the construction of the Tehran-Tabriz railway (Tehran City Hall Information 
Management Organization, 2007) and the Karkheh dam (Refworld, 2012).  Khatam al-
Aniba assigns these projects to either its subsidiaries or private companies under its 
control (Wehrey et al., 2009). 
21
 
 Other than construction projects, Khatam al-Aniba is also very active in the oil 
sector. It is also said that the agency is the only operator and contractor for Iran’s gas 
industry (Open Source Center, 2007). According to government officials, contracts are 
awarded to the agency because of its lower costs, skilled engineers, experience with 
various projects, and access to advanced and necessary supplies and resources (Wehrey et 
al., 2009).  
Since Khatam al-Aniba is under the IRGC umbrella, the agency has the perk of 
bypassing various bureaucratic obstacles in attaining a contract with a client. For 
example, the agency was given 1.3 billion dollars to build a 900-km natural gas pipeline 
that would transfer gas within the southern provinces of Iran. The National Iranian Gas 
Company waived bidding requirements fo Khatam al-Aniba. Their reasoning behind this 
                                               
21
 The website lists the name of the companies under Khatam al-Aniba. The website can be found at 
khatam..com. The page is in Farsi, but the page can be translated into English.   
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was that the supply of natural gas for poorer regions was urgent enough to ignore 
standard procedures (Wehrey et al., 2009).  
In a 2006 interview with the Iran Press,
22
 Abedzadeh was forced to answer 
questions regarding company funds and allegations earning contracts without 
participating in the bidding process. When responding to the allegations he simply stated 
“[the government has] seen our work. We must have done something for them to be 
willing to award us the contract without bidding” in order to justify the agency’s actions 
(Iran Press News, 2006).   
Abedzadeh also stated that only ten percent of employees came from IRGC ranks, 
in which 70 percent of their business adhered to military projects (Wehrey et al., 2009). 
When employees were interviewed, they would decline to say anything about the projects 
they have been working on, or their experience as an employee under Khatam al-Aniba 
(Iran Press News, 2006).      
Abedzadeh claims that funding for the agency comes from Iran’s foreign currency 
reserve. However, the interviewer asked a follow-up question as how this could be when 
“the foreign currency reserve account was established so 50 percent would be reserved 
and 50 percent would be loaned to the private sector, not to the government” (Iran Press 
News, 2006). Abedzadeh answered with “Others obtain those fund as well…The 
government does not do us any favors. We are paid to do our work. We are fined if we do 
not. Our difference with private companies is that we do not get to spend our profits” 
(Iran Press News, 2006). Instead, these profits are used to fund the armed forces of the 
IRGC (Wehrey et al., 2009).    
                                               
22 Iran Press News is based in Paris, France. The organization is known to write articles critical of the 
Islamic Regime, and is thought to be headed by Iranian exiles.  
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Public Works  
 
 The IRGC views economic competition with the private sector as trivial. They 
believe that their growing connection and business profile has created enough networks 
to offset any sort of dissent, and with public works projects, the IRGC is expanding the 
opportunity to gain support in rural regions of Iran (Wehrey et al., 2009). After all, it is 
the support of rural people that has counter balanced opposition from the more urban 
population.   
Essentially the IRGC has two motives in pursuing public works programs for 
rural areas. The first is to act as a security measure against potential uprisings, and 
increased security for villagers. The second is to create a positive image for the Basij and 
IRGC by aiding the rural population (Wehrey et al., 2009). The Basij began taking a role 
in rural construction in 2000, and has developed structures like the Kerman-Zahedan 
railway system and the Chabahar port in Sistan-Balchistan, under the supervision of 
Khatam al-Aniba (Wehrey et al., 2009).   
The increased Basij operated projects in rural regions led to an estimated 3.2 
million recruits in 2007 (Wehrey et al., 2009). According to Brigadier General 
Mohammad Hejazi, 15 million dollars had been “allocated in the 2007 national budget 
for increased development activities” as directed by Khamenei in order to dramatically 
boost “infrastructure and human capital development” (Wehrey et al., 2009).  
The number of recruits has continued to increase within these regions. This is 
most likely attributed to the socialization culture as well as the benefits awarded to rural 
men who become Basij members. Since most rural regions are impoverished, the 
presence of the Basij provides an opportunity for the youth to earn an income for their 
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family, and be part of an organization that has room for growth within the institution. 
Today, Basij members provide services including natural disaster relief, repairing of 
school buildings and supplies, such as tables and chairs. The Basij has also instituted a 
number of recreational facilities and has provided much assistance to the farming sector.  
Nonetheless, the IRGC’s growth in the economic sector has been criticized for 
hindering the benefits of participating in a global economy. Some believe that 
participating in the global market will only enhance Iran’s economic development. 
However, this would go against the interests of the IRGC, due to the fact that the 
institution prefers to operate as a monopoly rather than have to face competition.  
This is the main reason why international sanctions are not affecting the IRGC, 
but rather, strengthening their power within the economic sector. The sanctions have 
resulted in increased illicit economic activity that is controlled by the IRGC.      
 
 
Impact of International Sanctions 
 
Since Iran’s pursuit for nuclear energy, western nations have taken a firm stance 
against this undertaking through the implementation of sanctions. On the 23
rd
 of January 
2012, European Union foreign ministers agreed to ban petroleum and petrochemical 
imports from Iran. This would begin July 1, 2012 (Sydow, 2012).  The sanction permits 
new investments in Iranian oil companies and exports to Iran for the use of oil industries 
(Sydow, 2012). This is only one of the handfuls of sanctions western countries are 
imposing on Iran in an attempt to force it to abandon its nuclear program.   
However, these sanctions are only feeding the powerhouse that dominates Iran – 
the IRGC. Economic sanctions are forcing Iranian companies to resort to illegal means of 
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doing international business, such as smuggling, or through companies that facilitate 
transactions between Iran and Western corporations (Sydow, 2012). The IRGC and the 
companies that they control are usually involved in these back-handed business deals. 
The IRGC ignores the legality of the process in exchange for payment, and as an 
institution that oversees the black market; they are making a major profit from western 
sanctions (Sydow, 2012).  
The sanctions have also hurt their domestic and foreign business competitors. The 
IRGC has an advantage over its competitors in that it is able to use state funds. 
Ahmadinejad has given the IRGC “hundreds of no-bid government contracts in addition 
to billions of dollars in loans for construction, infrastructure and energy projects” 
(Wright, 2010). Sanctions will only further damage Iran’s economy, but will bolster the 
power and control of the IRGC.   
Western countries, such as the United States, are well aware of the repercussions 
of their sanctions. However, because the IRGC is so engrossed in Iran’s economy, it is 
difficult to impose harsh sanctions without hurting the Iranian people. The Iranian 
government is also well aware of this. They know that the west is not willing to harm 
Iranian civilians, thereby, are continuing with their nuclear pursuits.  
The sanctions prove how much of a dominant force the IRGC has become within 
the Iranian economy. International restriction cannot even slow the institution because it 
is so embedded within all sectors of the country.    
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EGYPTIAN MILITARY IN THE ECONOMIC SECTOR 
 
 
Since the 1970s, the Egyptian military’s role in economic activity has expanded. 
Currently, the Egyptian military controls as much as 40 percent of Egypt’s economy 
(Hammer & Ismail, 2011). 
23
 Mubarak and former Egyptian Minister of Defense Field 
Marshal Abu Ghazala (1980-1989) believed that the participation of the military in the 
Egyptian economy would greatly contribute to its growth and development (Gotowicki, 
1997).   
The reason behind this logic for Mubarak and Ghazala was that they believed 
certain attributes and functions of the military would make it one of the few organizations 
that could lead to Egypt’s economic prosperity. According to Gotowicki there are number 
of factors that lead to this perception, including:   
 
the potential to exploit the comparative economic advantages of the  
military (low salaries, heavy equipment infrastructure, etc.) in fostering  
economic growth; the military's goal of self-sufficiency; and a need to  
effectively employ large numbers of soldiers in meaningful activities  
when defensive requirements are low, but there is an interest in  
maintaining a large force structure for deterrent purposes  
(Gotowicki, 1997).  
 
The Egyptian military’s involvement in the economy is said to benefit the civilian 
sector (Springborg, 1988). Private companies and entrepreneurs have received millions of 
dollars from “associated contracts the army has awarded as well as in cooperative efforts 
in technology sharing” (Gotowicki, 1997).  The Egyptian military is also a great 
socialization tool into the civilian economic sector, in which military men are trained to 
be able to apply their learned skills into the work force. It can also be argued that without 
                                               
23 These estimates are difficult to predict due to information that is concealed by the Egyptian military and 
government. The numbers should be taken with a grain of salt.  
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the heavy involvement of the military in the economic sector, Islamic institutions would 
have the ability to take control of them (Satloff, 1988).  This would be a worst case 
scenario for the Egyptian government, and has continued to be. This is also a main 
concern for the Egyptian military that currently holds power.  
Military Industries  
Military production began in Egypt in the 1820s under Mohammed Ali in an 
attempt to gain regional power.
24
 As a result, military factories began to form all across 
the country, producing uniforms and small arms (Stier, 2011). Their role expanded with 
the state-led economy from the early 1950s, currently producing or assembling a wide 
variety of products including: 
 
artillery, mortar and small arms ammunition, indigenously produced  
armored personnel carriers, the US M1A1 Abrams tank, British Lynx  
helicopters, Aerospatiale Gazelle helicopters, European AlphaJet  
aircraft, Chinese F-7 fighter aircraft, aircraft engines, and a wide variety  
of military electronics including radars and night vision devices  
(Gotowicki, 1997).  
 
 
 
In contrast with Ali’s vision, the recent goal within Mubarak’s presidency was to 
create a strong military industry to attain self sufficiency. This has proven to be of special 
importance. There have been a number of instances when either the Soviet Union or the 
United States has abandoned Egypt – two countries that the military heavily depended on 
for supplies and resources (Gotowicki, 1997). For example, the Soviet Union refused to 
rearm or assist the Egyptian military after the 1973 war, and dropped all cooperation 
                                               
24 Mohammed Ali was an Albanian commander in the Ottoman army who became a self-declared Khedive, 
or viceroy, of Egypt and Sudan. He is known to be the founder of modern Egypt due to his military and 
economic reforms.  
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(Gotowicki, 1997). The Egyptian military has learned that a self-sufficient institution 
creates a greater independence and autonomy in security affairs.    
It owns about 35 factories that produce anything from food to artillery, employing 
up to 100,000 people (Tadros, 2012).  In the 1980’s, production value in the military 
agency was estimated at 400 million dollars a year, and military exports at 191 million 
dollars per year (Sayigh, 1992). The arms sales of the Iran-Iraq war also greatly enriched 
the Egyptian military financially as exports increased from 30 million dollars in 1981 to 
550 million dollars in 1988 (Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1991).
 
However, 
following the Iran-Iraq war, as represented in the Figure 2, exports from the military 
industry significantly decreased.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 - Egyptian Arms Imports compared with Arms Exports. Source: Arms Control 
and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, Various 
issues 1965-1995. Arms Imports is in red, while Arms Exports is illustrated in green. 
 
Since the Iran-Iraq war, Egypt’s military production sector has declined. Egypt 
has been suffering with a crumbling economy since Sadat’s presidency, which has 
affected funding. Inadequate funding, low productivity, and a shortage of external 
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markets, has prevented Egypt from resuming its once successful military industry. Their 
market, in which Arab states were its biggest customers, has flopped. Now Arab states 
are turning to countries like Russia and the United States which offer more advanced 
weaponry and technology for a cheaper price. Iraq was also removed from Egypt’s 
market when they were sanctioned for invading Kuwait (Gotowicki, 1997).    
Egypt may have factories devoted to assembling sophisticated weaponry, but the 
military receives these parts from the United States who keep the technology involved 
closely to them (Gotowicki, 1997). As a result, Egypt’s military industries have done 
little to enhance their regional power. In fact, it is their involvement in the civilian sector 
that has truly been impressive in expanding their economic power.  
Civilian Industries  
The late 1970s ushered a number of economic difficulties for Egypt, including 
increased government deficits and a decreasing per capita income (The World Bank, 
2012).
 
In an attempt to stabilize the economy, the Egyptian government looked towards 
the military to provide the self-sufficiency the country needed. Thus, the economic power 
of the Egyptian military expanded to the civilian sector.  
The Egyptian military has become involved in almost every type of business, 
running day care centers, beach resorts, and even manufacturing products such as 
television sets, stationary, clothing, and a brand of bottled water (named after a general’s 
daughter, Safi) (Kirkpatrick, 2011).   The Egyptian military has also 
participated in major infrastructure projects including the construction of schools, power 
lines, and bridges. However, unlike the IRGC, reports have shown contracts conducted 
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with private, civilian businesses (Gotowicki, 1997). Once again, because of lack of 
research and the secrecy of the Egyptian military, not much data can be used to support 
the statement.  
Overall, the increasing expansion into the economic sector has proved to be very 
successful for the Egyptian military. They have been able to attain the goal of self-
sufficiency and earn much profit as a result. Since the Egyptian military has now 
assumed temporary leadership, it is more likely than not that their economic activity will 
grow. 
  
ECONOMIC IMPACT ON REBELLIONS 
 
Economic issues were one of the major catalysts of the Egyptian revolution, and 
the Iranian uprising. It was also a contributing factor to the betrayal of the Egyptian 
military. As mentioned in chapter one, senior officers became threatened upon hearing 
rumors of Mubarak appointing his own son as his successor. This would mean that senior 
officers who were promised top positions within the economic sector would face the 
danger of losing these positions to men whom Mubarak’s son would favor. A transition 
of power resembling a monarchy was deeply opposed by the Egyptian military.  
However, unlike the Egyptian military, the IRGC has little to complain about the future 
of their economic standing.  
The Egyptian military and IRGC clearly had the manpower and funds to quell any 
sort of uprising, and as detailed from previous chapters, both the Supreme Leader and 
former president Mubarak have only fed these institutions with more power and control 
over the economic sector.   
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Profits made by these institutions have gone to personal gain for senior officers, 
funding stipends and housing allowances for new recruits, financial support to veterans 
and their families, and of course, funding for armed force related costs.  
Over the years, both institutions have had an increasingly large impact on the 
economic sector, operating in a wide variety of fields. Members from all ranks have been 
able to reap the benefits in one form or another. However, it is evident that one of reasons 
for the Egyptian military’s break Mubarak resulted from senior officers who were faced 
with the threat of losing powerful positions within the economic sector.  
Whereas high ranking officials of the IRGC faced minimal threat to their 
influential positions within the Iranian economy. By examining the political role of these 
two institutions in the next chapter, it may become evident that economic determinants 
have become the deciding factor of these institutions allegiance to their respective state’s 
government in the wake of the recent rebellions.   Nonetheless, the dominant role that 
both institutions play within their respective state’s economy is vital to their stability and 
growth as a well-integrated and cohesive organization.        
 
 
JOHNSON’S APPLIED PRINCIPLES 
  
 Two of Johnson’s principles that can be applied to this chapter are the second 
(“ignorance is useful”) and the fourth (a pattern illustrated by all components). Both 
institutions use economic incentives to maintain their recruits. However, the appeal of the 
Egyptian military and the IRGC is not simply financial, for it is also acts as a 
socialization tool. Men join these institutions to gain connections and skills for the 
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workforce, or in hopes of being admitted to a university. Some of these men continue to 
serve in order to advance within the ranks. 
    These enticing rewards are usually offered to rural men, who are poor and lack 
education. Since these men lack the resources to make a better life for themselves, many 
of them choose to join these institutions in hopes of greater opportunities. The poor and 
uneducated allow the IRGC and Egyptian military to exploit these men in order to 
establish the next generation of loyal and committed members. Without the recruitment 
of men within this class, the IRGC and Egyptian military would not be as strong. Rural 
men live a simple life, and generally have a simple outlook. This simplicity prevents 
conflict within the institution, for if components were complex, a power struggle would 
ensue. If these institutions were made up of educated men the system would not be able 
to efficiently function since lower ranks would attempt to dominate higher ranks. 
This shows some sort of a pattern within all ranks and divisions under the 
Egyptian military and the IRGC. Incentives and rewards are vital to the operation of these 
two institutions. The pride and prestige of being part of such a powerful organization may 
contribute to commitment of its members, but without the potential of gaining power and 
glory, a recruit may not choose to remain with the institution. Recruits feed off small 
incentives, such as weekly wages, while senior officers feed off larger incentives, such as 
control over one of the institution’s companies following his service. 
However, unlike the Egyptian military, the IRGC reveres the Supreme Leader. 
Many IRGC members come from religious backgrounds, and as a result, live to serve 
Khamenei and to preserve the values of the 1979 Revolution, whereas the Egyptian 
military lacks the attitude of protecting moral values of the divine. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
Political Role 
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POLITICAL ROLE OF IRGC 
 
As previously mentioned, the role of the IRGC in politics has been strongly 
debated. Arguments have been made that Khomeini did not intend the IRGC to 
participate in domestic politics because the origins of the IRGC called for the force to 
only defend against enemies of the values of the revolution. However, under Article 150 
of the Islamic Republic’s Constitution, the IRGC is defined as the “guardian of the 
revolution and of its achievements”, Section 5 further describes it as the defender of 
“politico-military” and “ideological” matters (Wehrey, et al., 2009). 
Since Khomeini’s death, the political role of the IRGC has increased. However, it 
is also important to note that Rafsanjani’s presidency from 1989 to 1997 was a lull period 
for the political involvement of IRGC members (Wehrey, et al., 2009). During this time 
the IRGC was focusing on its image, and as a result, substituted radical officials for more 
pragmatic one (Wehrey, et al., 2009). Nonetheless, when Khamenei became the Supreme 
Leader, he bolstered the political role of the IRGC in order to gain the legitimacy he 
originally lacked from his peers.   
Khamenei also expanded the political role of the IRGC to prevent reformist 
presidents from achieving more liberal agendas. Iran has produced one of the most 
“intellectually vibrant democratic movements in the contemporary Middle East” (Takeyh, 
2009, p. 181), and as discussed before, contention between former reformist presidents 
and conservative clerics has given the IRGC leverage to expand their domestic, political 
role.  
When Khatami won a landslide victory in 1997 and the presidency, many IRGC 
members feared that he would be the next Mikhail Gorbachev: loyal to the ideology of 
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the regime, but leading the government downs a path that would destroy the system 
(Alfoneh, 2008). Khatami’s presidency ushered in a reformist movement that attempted 
to alter the republic towards freedom and democracy. The movement expanded to youth, 
universities, and even various newspapers and magazines which published articles 
denouncing the IRGC.     
Angered by reformist actions, the IRGC and Khamenei took it upon themselves to 
dismantle the voices behind the movement. In Mashhad, Safavi spoke of “suspicious acts 
and behavior of some people siding with the U.S. policies and interests in the country,” 
and added that some of these people may be working within the government (Islamic 
Republic News Agency, 2003). This referred to reformists within the government who 
were fighting for a more liberal regime.  
Khamenei ordered crackdowns within the government. Two prominent men who 
were caught in the fire were, Gholamhossein Karbaschi and Abdollah Noori, who were 
imprisoned and impeached in 1999 (Takeyh, 2009). Karbaschi was the former mayor of 
Tehran, political activist, and close ally of Khatami, while Noori was a reformist 
politician and cleric. These men were used as examples to scare reformists from pursuing 
further action (Takeyh, 2009).  
The IRGC used the courts not only to silence dissident political activists and 
clerics, but also to punish the media. Once such example took place “on July 12, 2000, 
[when] the IRGC filed a complaint against the weekly Omid-e Zanjan at Branch 1408 of 
Tehran's Public Court for insulting the IRGC and its commander in an article criticizing 
their interference in politics” (Alfoneh, 2008). 
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Under Ahmadinejad, the political role of the IRGC dramatically expanded. 
According to Alfoneh, by 2008, nine of the twenty-one ministry portfolios were occupied 
by either former IRGC or Basij officers (Alfoneh, 2008). Ahmadinejad used - and 
continues to use the power of the IRGC to his advantage. He is able to gain their support 
through lucrative handouts given to senior officers and veterans. And because 
Ahmadinejad was a conservative serving the interests of Khameini, the IRGC is even 
more loyal to the president.   
The 2008 parliamentary elections illustrated the growing political role of the 
IRGC, supported by Khameini and Ahmadinejad. Khamenei appointed former IRGC 
commander Ali-Reza Afshar to oversee the elections (Alfoneh, 2008). The IRGC had 
complete control over which candidates could run for parliament positions. According to 
the minister of interior, 7,168 candidates registered for the elections, in which the Council 
of Guardians approved of 5,000 of them (Islamic Republic of Iran Ministry of Interior, 
2008). Candidates were disqualified for various reasons, from filing the paperwork late, 
to having connections with the shah’s regime (Alfoneh, 2008).   
Khamenei also appointed IRGC veteran Ezzatollah Zarghami as head of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) (Alfoneh, 2008). Zarghami refused to air 
speech from reformist candidates. In light of the 2009 uprisings, the IRGC also shut-
down internet access to Iranians during the 2012 parliamentary elections.   
The IRGC also became much more integrated in domestic politics when 
Ahmadinejad utilized the force to guarantee him second term in office. Soon after his 
2005 victory, Ahmadinejad replaced provincial governors who supported reformists with 
“officials recruited from the ranks of the IRGC, the Basij, and the Islamic Republic 
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prison administration” (Alfoneh, 2008). It became evident that Khamenei wanted to 
prevent another reformist from assuming the presidency. Ahmadinejad systematically 
appointed conservative allies in the following positions in order to ensure another four 
years in power:  
 
 
 
The governors of Kerman, West Azerbaijan, Khuzestan, Hamadan, and  
Ilam are all IRGC veterans while the governors of Zanjan, Lorestan, Isfahan,  
and South Khorasan are veterans of the prison administration (Alfoneh, 2008).  
 
The importance of these appointments is worth mentioning because of the impact 
they have on elections. Governors have the ability to manipulate elections by transferring 
funds to candidates, and skewing the polls to alter the outcome in the respective province. 
This operation became evident in the aftermath of the 2009 elections. The 2009 
presidential elections established the IRGC as the dominant political force in Iran. 
Members of the institution may be motivated by material gain, but their devotion and 
loyalty remains for Khamenei and the pillars of the revolution, which is why the IRGC 
does not hesitate to get involved in domestic politics.    
However, most recently, there has been a political struggle between Khamenei 
and Ahmadinejad. In the 2012 parliamentary elections, Khamenei had the allegiance of 
the IRGC resulting in the visctory of Khamenei’s candidates. Ahmadinejad has now been 
marginalized, a lame duck, further showing how the IRGC support is essential to power, 
and strengthening the bond between the IRGC and the Supreme Leader. 
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POLITICAL ROLE OF EGYPTIAN MILITARY 
After the 1952 Egyptian revolution, Nasser appointed many high-ranking officers 
to cabinet positions, and other senior positions.  However, since 1967, military 
involvement in domestic politics has decreased (Gotowicki, 1997).  The primary reason 
for this occurrence was Sadat’s efforts in demilitarizing the military in political affairs. 
He removed senior officers who posed a threat to his regime, and appointed fewer senior 
or retired officers to top government positions (Gotowicki, 1997).    
In order to prevent military dominance over domestic politics, Sadat 
“manipulated” senior military positions by preventing any one commander to stay in 
power for too long. For example, from 1971 to 1980, Sadat appointed seven Ministers of 
Defense (Gotowicki, 1997). The graph below illustrates the decrease of senior officer 
serving in the cabinet during Sadat’s presidency.   
 
Figure 3 - Number of Egyptian Military Officers serving on the Cabinet, 1951-1981. Source: 
Mark N. Cooper. "The Demilitarization of the Egyptian Cabinet." International Journal of 
Middle East Studies. 14 (1982). pp. 203-225.  
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When Mubarak assumed power, he followed in the footsteps of Sadat and 
continued to exercise a tight leash on senior officers to prevent them from dominating 
domestic politics. Although Mubarak, like all his predecessors since the 1952 revolution 
came from the military ranks, the Egyptian military has exercised minimal influence in 
political affairs prior to the 2011 uprisings. Throughout the 30 years prior to Mubarak’s 
overthrow, there was no indication that military loyalty to the regime and the president 
depended on senior officers receiving powerful positions within the political sector.    
Before the 2011 rebellion, the military was not a dominant player in domestic 
politics. Interest groups of unionized workers, urban commercial businesses, and even 
clerical, religious, and secular intellectuals have become politically active. Another 
important factor behind the declining military role in domestic politics “is the emergence 
of a group of trained, experienced, and professional civilians such as Osama al-Baz and 
Amre Moussa” 25 (Gotowicki, 1997).  These two men have served in cabinet positions, 
and have been close aides of Mubarak (Gotowicki, 1997).  
Up until the revolution, the Egyptian military seemed to be unconcerned about its 
role in domestic politics. Economic power is more important to the Egyptian military, 
which is most likely what has offset its minimal political influence. As stated previously, 
one main factor behind the military’s betrayal of Mubarak may have been the fact he was 
rumored to choose his son as a successor, and as a result, threaten top business positions 
for senior officers. Egyptian military leaders do not feel the need to go beyond their 
boundaries in exercising professional military activities. Some may feel that they should 
only subject themselves to military business. Demonstrated in the food riots, the military 
                                               
25 Moussa is an Egyptian politician and diplomat who served in the government of Egypt as Minister of 
Foreign Affairs from 1991 to 2001. He ran for president in 2005, and will be candidate once again in the 
2012 presidential election. 
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is also reluctant to interfere in restraining the government’s domestic opponents. If there 
is one entity the Egyptian military prides themselves upon it is their reputation. Thus, by 
interfering in conflict between the government and people, the military feels their image 
is being tarnished in one form or another. This is another factor that may have led to the 
overthrow of Mubarak.      
 
JOHNSON’S APPLIED PRINCIPLES 
In applying Johnson’s third principle (random encounters benefit the growth of a 
system through feedback) to the IRGC, it is evident that both the institution and leaders 
of the government benefit from the exchange. However, the exchanges between IRGC 
members and Khamenei and Ahmadinejad are not random. They are calculated, and are 
done so in order to preserve the traditional values of the revolution. However, it can be 
said that reformists within the Islamic government have created the “random encounters” 
necessary to encourage Khamenei to give the IRGC more political power.  
Khatami’s liberal agenda and reformist rhetoric from various media outlets has 
made Khamenei and the IRGC aware of their surroundings, learning to crush their 
opposition through the political interference. This applies to Johnson’s fifth principle, 
“local information leads to global wisdom”. If reformist actions did not shake up 
conservatives in the way that it did, Khamenei may have never increased the political 
power of the IRGC. The IRGC altered their behavior and functions in order to serve 
Khamenei, and preserve the values of the revolution. 
However, unlike the IRGC, the Egyptian military has been reluctant to participate 
in domestic politics until recently. This recent change is mostly due to the fact that the 
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military is afraid to see Egypt potentially under the control of the Muslim Brotherhood. If 
the Muslim Brotherhood were to take power, the economic interests of the military would 
be in danger.  The “random encounters” the Egyptian military has experienced in 
defining their political role is that of protestors. As previously mentioned, the military 
prefers not to harm its own people. Their reluctance in choosing sides between the people 
and the government has actually benefitted the military to some degree. Overall, since the 
military received a satisfactory perception from Egyptians until the aftermath of the 2011 
revolution, the military has been able to take advantage of the situation in an attempt to 
feed their interests. 
The Egyptian military is very conscious of its reputation, and adapts to opposition 
primarily based on the effects it would have on their image, which stands above and apart 
from politics. The 2011 revolution was surrounded with international pressure for 
Mubarak to step down, and because the military did not want to be seen as supporting a 
dictator, they changed their action to maintain their image and economic power.   
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CONCLUSION  
 
One of the main differences between the Egyptian military and the IRGC is the 
role of ideology. Members of the IRGC revere their Supreme Leader primarily because of 
the sanctity of his position. Ideology plays a major role in the stability of the IRGC, and 
the loyalty to the regime. Islam is the pattern between all components of the IRGC. The 
level of faith may vary from member to member, but it is a connection that keeps IRGC 
members and their affiliates united.  
However, the Egyptian military lacks a spiritual pattern. The pattern within its 
system can be attributed to economic rewards. This is especially gratifying for men who 
live in country that has been increasingly struggling in the economy. Nonetheless, that is 
not to say that the IRGC is not committed to the same kinds of incentives. In fact, a 
unification pattern shared by the IRGC and Egyptian military is a sufficient amount of 
members who are prideful and value reputation almost more than anything else. This 
mindset of Egyptian and Iranian armed force members can either led to the detriment or 
growth of the organization. In most cases, it is the growth.  
The appeal of the Egyptian military and the IRGC is not simply financial, for it is 
also acts as a socialization tool that can advance the lives and well-being of its members. 
Men join these institutions to gain connections and skills for the workforce, or in hopes of 
being admitted to a university. This adds to the esteem many Egyptian and Iranian men 
seek. 
  However, according to Johnson, patterns of components are only one part of 
maintaining a stable and functioning complex system. Men from poor, uneducated 
backgrounds play one of the important roles within the IRGC and Egyptian military. As 
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“components”, men from poor and uneducated backgrounds are the backbone of these 
two institutions because they provide numbers and moldable minds.  Rewards are usually 
offered to rural men, who lack the resources to create a better life. Simple men, much like 
one-dimensional components, prevent conflict within the institution, for if components 
were complex, a power struggle would ensue. If these institutions were made up of 
educated men, the system would not be able to efficiently function since lower ranks 
would attempt to dominate higher ranks. 
 Thus, it can be stated that the Egyptian military and IRGC are bottom-up 
organizations. Both heavily rely upon the recruitment of rural men. Components of the 
system are encouraged by various incentives and lucrative positions to remain loyal to the 
force. However, because the Egyptian military and IRGC have so much power and are so 
well integrated into society, senior officers have the opportunity to stage a coup. This has 
played out for the Egyptian military, but mainly because senior officers are worried about 
their economic interests. As previously stated, political gain means little to the institution. 
The Egyptian military will most likely choose the next president. He may or may not be a 
military officer, but he must have the military’s economic interests in mind.  
On the other hand, it is difficult to know under what conditions the IRGC could 
stage a coup. It has so much autonomy and power that there is no need to abandon the 
regime. However, as stated before, the majority of IRGC members are religious men who 
almost never do anything to harm Khamenei, or the establishment of the Islamic 
Republic.     
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